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Plain Meaning,
Precedent, and
Metaphysics:
Interpreting the
“Point Source”
Element of the
Clean Water Act
Offense

I.

Introduction

Clean Water Act (CWA)1 §301(a) prohibits “the discharge
of any pollutant by any person” unless in compliance
with several listed sections.2 The listed sections authorize
the issuance of two types of CWA permits3 and specify
their substantive requirements. Section 502(12) defines
“discharge of a pollutant” to mean “any addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.”4 In
sum, the subsection prohibits (1) any addition (2) of any
pollutant (3) to navigable waters (4) from any point source
(5) by any person except in compliance with a CWA permit.5 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has called this the
CWA’s “core command.”6
This Article, the fourth in a series of five, examines how
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the
courts have interpreted the meaning of the term “point
source,” the fourth jurisdictional element of the water pollution control offense. In the CWA, “point source” is an
artificial construct with a statutory definition, followed by
lists of examples and exclusions. Disputes over the interpretations of the statutory term have produced a steady stream
of reported decisions since the initial implementation of
the statute in 1979. Even after four decades, many of these
issues are unresolved and new issues continue to arise.

by Jeffrey G. Miller
Jeffrey G. Miller is Professor Emeritus, Pace Law School.

Author’s Note: The author thanks Laura Young, Pace 2015, for her
extensive research and analysis that form the background of this
Article and her discussions with me of the issues it analyzes. She was
a delight to work with.
1.	

Summary
This Article, the fourth in a series of five, examines
the continuing struggles to define “point source”
and “nonpoint source” under the Clean Water Act.
State regulation of nonpoint sources is neither pervasive nor robust, and most continuing water pollution
problems can be traced primarily to nonpoint sources.
EPA should define nonpoint sources by regulation
and begin to expand the definition of point source by
incorporating established case law and Agency practice to bring more nonpoint sources into the point
source definition.
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2.	
3.	

4.	
5.	

6.	

33 U.S.C. §§1251-1387, ELR Stat. FWPCA §§101-607. The basic contours of the statute were established in the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, Oct. 18, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat.
816.
33 U.S.C. §1311(a).
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issues permits under
CWA §402, 33 U.S.C. §1342, to regulate the discharge of pollutants; the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) issues permits under CWA
§404, 33 U.S.C. §1344, to regulate the filling of wetlands.
33 U.S.C. §1362(12).
Three earlier articles in ELR News & Analysis focused individually on the
§301(a) water pollution control offense elements “addition,” “pollutant,”
and “navigable waters.” See Jeffrey G. Miller, Plain Meaning, Precedent,
and Metaphysics: Interpreting the “Addition” Element of the Clean Water Act
Offense, 44 ELR 10770 (Sept. 2014); Jeffrey G. Miller, Plain Meaning,
Precedent, and Metaphysics: Interpreting the “Pollutant” Element of the Federal Water Pollution Offense, 44 ELR 10960 (Nov. 2014); and Jeffrey G.
Miller, Plain Meaning, Precedent, and Metaphysics: Interpreting the “Navigable Waters” Element of the Clean Water Act Offense, 45 ELR 10548 (June
2015).
Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S.
261, 298, 39 ELR 20133 (2009). The author has elsewhere called it “the
basic prohibition” of the CWA. Jeffrey G. Miller et al., Introduction
to Environmental Law: Cases and Materials on Water Pollution
Control 141 (2008).
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II.

Congressional Action: The Statutory
Definition and Legislative History of
Point Source

A.

Statutory Definition

Section 502(14) of the CWA provides that:
“[P]oint source” means any discernible, confined and
discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any
pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which
pollutants are or may be discharged. This term does not
include agricultural discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture.7

The definition of point source is the most grammatically complex of the elements’ statutory definitions. It has
a compound structure beginning with the definition, a
“discernible, confined and discrete conveyance”; followed
by an inclusive list of 12 examples; and ending with two
exceptions. The comparative structural complexity of the
point source definition reflects that, unlike the other elements, it is a statutory construct with no meaning apart
from its statutory definition. Before the enactment of the
CWA, “addition” and “pollutant” each had plain meanings and “navigable waters” had both a plain and a legal
meaning. However, while both “point” and “source” had
plain meanings before enactment of the CWA, their combination into one term did not have a preexisting plain
meaning. “Point” in its most pertinent definition means
“a particular spot, place, or position in an area or on a
map, object or surface”; and “source” in its most pertinent
definition means “a place, person or thing from which
something comes or can be obtained.”8 Significantly, these
two words, alone or together, do not suggest a “discernible,
confined and discrete conveyance,” the statutory definition
of “point source.”
The other elements are on/off switches, determining
whether a discharge is regulated by the CWA in one of its
two permit programs. If a discharge lacks an “addition,”
a “pollutant,” or a “navigable water,” the CWA does not
regulate the discharge, regardless of whether it is through
a “point source.” By contrast, “point source” is a switch
that shuttles discharges between different CWA schemes.
If a discharge meets the other elements and is through a
“point source,” it is regulated by one of the CWA’s two
permit programs. If a discharge meets the other elements
but is not through a “point source,” it may be regulated
by the CWA’s nonpoint source program. While the CWA
does not mention non-additions, non-pollutants, or nonnavigable waters, it does mention “nonpoint sources”9 and
provides for programs regulating them. Despite the impor7.	
8.	
9.	

33 U.S.C. §1362(14).
Oxford English Dictionary, www.oxforddictionaries.com.
CWA §§105(d)(1), 201(c), 208(b)(2)(F), 319(a) & (b); 33 U.S.C.
§§1255(d)(1), 1281(c), 1288(b)(2)(F), 1239(a) & (b).
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tance of nonpoint sources to the structure of the statute and
to understanding the term point source, the statute does
not define nonpoint source. Nor does EPA define nonpoint
source in its permit program regulations, although it does
so in informal documents.10
Although the U.S. Congress did not define “point” or
“source” generally, it defined “source” for the limited purpose of CWA §306,11 the section requiring EPA to establish technology-based standards for new sources.12 Section
306(a)(3) defines a source as a building or facility from
which pollutants originate. This “source” is a new manufacturing facility, not a point source—that is, a new discharge
pipe leading from the facility to navigable water.13 This
makes sense, for new sources are subject to higher levels of
pollution control than are existing sources. It is easier and
cheaper for new sources to design and build facilities with
state-of-the-art pollution control than for existing sources
to retrofit existing facilities with it, particularly since new
facilities can often be designed to use less water and hazardous materials, thus generating less pollutants to treat. The
same rationale would not apply if the newly constructed
source was merely the pipe that carries pollutants from
the facility to navigable water. Thus, “source” in both the
dictionary definition and in the limited CWA definition
of “new source” connotes the origin of pollutants. “Point
source,” on the other hand, connotes the conveyance of
pollutants from their origin to their addition to navigable
water. In other words, point source is the place of the addition of pollutants to navigable water rather than the origin
of the pollutants.14 When we interpret point source, we are
not searching for the plain meaning of “point,” “source,” or
“point source,” but for the plain meanings of “discernible,”
“confined,” “discrete,” “conveyance,” “pipe,” “tunnel,” or
other words used in the statutory definition of the term.
Indeed, the plain meaning of “source” obscures the congressional definition of “point source.”
If the definition of point source was straightforward
and clear, the statute’s failure to define point, source, and
nonpoint source would pose no problems. Unfortunately,
on close reading, the definition is far from clear. First, it
defines a point source as a conveyance “from which pollutants are or may be discharged.” This makes the definition
circular, because the CWA in turn defines “discharge” as
any addition of any pollutant by any point source. Second,
it defines point source as a conveyance, but lists a concentrated animal feeding operation (CAFO) as an example of
a point source, although a CAFO is not a typical conveyance. Instead, a CAFO is an agricultural facility more like
10.
11.
12.
13.

40 C.F.R. §122.2.
33 U.S.C. §1316.
CWA §306(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. §1316(a)(3).
Mahelona v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., Inc., 418 F. Supp. 1328, 1334-35, 7 ELR
20031 (D. Haw. 1976).
14. South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95,
105, 34 ELR 20021 (2004). The definition of point source “makes it plain
that a point source need not be the original source of the pollutant’; it need
only convey the pollutant to ‘navigable waters.’” Id. See also United States v.
Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 332-33, 38 ELR 20041 (5th Cir. 2008); Dague v. City
of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1354, 21 ELR 21133 (2d Cir. 1991).
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an industrial facility than a conveyance. Third, the two
statutory exceptions contained in the definition, “agricultural stormwater discharges” and “return flows from
irrigated agriculture,” are not conveyances either; instead,
they are liquids that are or may be conveyed. Without the
exemptions, they would not be point sources. The internal
inconsistencies suggest that: (1) Congress did not (and perhaps could not) clearly articulate the distinction between
point source and nonpoint source; (2) Congress intended
some agricultural discharges to be regulated by the CWA’s
permit programs and intended other agricultural discharges not to be regulated by the permit programs; and
(3) determining which agricultural discharges are point
sources will be a major issue in interpreting “point source.”
The failure of Congress to define nonpoint sources15 is
particularly troublesome because its apparent meaning is
anything other than a point source. But does that mean
a nonconveyance or a conveyance that is indiscernible,
unconfined, and indiscrete? As used in the legislative history of the CWA, and as commonly used when discussing
water pollution, nonpoint sources are discharges of stormwater. The two are not synonymous, however. Stormwater may be collected and channeled by human activity,
in which case it is discharged by a point source.16 On the
other hand, there are nonpoint sources that have nothing
to do with stormwater.17
These inconsistencies help explain the difficulties that
courts and EPA have encountered in construing point
source and the frequent conflation by the courts, EPA,
and litigants of that element with other elements of the
CWA offense18 and even with other CWA terms that are
15. Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199, 219 (2d Cir. 2009).
16. EPA’s definition of “discharge of pollutants,” for instance, specifically includes stormwater that is collected and channeled by man. 40 C.F.R.
§122.2.
17. Examples held to be nonpoint sources that have nothing to do with stormwater include, for example, people and animals.
18. For conflation with “addition,” see, e.g., National Cotton Council, v. U.S.
EPA, 553 F.3d 927, 938-39, 39 ELR 20006 (6th Cir. 2009) (EPA erroneously argued that a pesticide spray bar cannot be a point source because
it did not add pollutants to water, i.e., it did not spray excess pesticides);
Peconic Baykeeper, Inc. v. Suffolk Cnty., 600 F.3d 180, 188, 40 ELR 20098
(2d Cir. 2010) (district court erroneously held spray bar was not a point
source because it added pesticide to air rather than to water); Dague, 935
F.2d at 1354 (the losing party erroneously argued that a culvert could not
be a point source because it did not add a pollutant to navigable water for
the first time); National Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 Fd.2d 156, 165, 13
ELR 20015 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (EPA erroneously argued that a dam was not
a point source because it did not add pollutants from the outside world).
For conflation with “navigable waters,” see, e.g., Rapanos v. United States,
547 U.S. 715, 735, 36 ELR 20116 (2006) (ditches may sometimes, but
not often, be both point sources and navigable waters); National Ass’n of
Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 699 F. Supp. 2d 209, 215-17,
40 ELR 20104 (D.D.C. 2010) (the losing party erroneously argued that a
ditch cannot be navigable water because it is a point source). For conflation
with “pollutant,” see, e.g., National Cotton Council, 553 F.3d at 938-39
(EPA erroneously argued that a pesticide spray bar was not a point source
because it did not spray pollutants, but instead only a consumer product:
pesticides); United States v. West Indies Transp., Inc., 127 F.3d 299, 309, 28
ELR 20202 (3d Cir. 1997) (the defendant erroneously argued that a barge
could not be a point source because the barge was a pollutant when parts
of it were torn off and thrown into the water). For conflation with “by any
person,” see, e.g., United States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 647,
23 ELR 21526 (2d Cir. 1993) (a person cannot be included in the fourth
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not elements of the offense.19 Conflation also results from
the fact that the elements (all nouns) are all linked by
prepositions. Some courts have even treated the prepositions as elements.20

B.

Legislative History of Point Source

The U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate
bills both used “point source” in the definition of “discharge of a pollutant” and defined point source identically,
except that the House version included “from which there
is or may be a thermal discharge.”21 The omission of thermal discharges from the enacted “point source” definition
is of no significance, however, because §502(6) defines
“pollutant” to include “heat.” Moreover, CWA §316(a)22
provides specific regulation for thermal discharges in the
§402 permit program. Nothing in the House, Senate, or
Conference Reports further explains the meanings of point
source, nonpoint source, the differences between the two
terms, or why the permit programs are limited to point
sources. Some comments made during the floor debates
address these issues, but the comments are no less confusing than the statutory definition of point source.
Sen. Edmund Muskie (D-Me.), the chief sponsor of the
Senate bill, on which most of the statute is based, attempted
to illuminate the distinction between point source and
nonpoint source:
The discharge standard applies to point source control.
Agricultural runoff is one form of agricultural activity
that is a nonpoint source. It is a runoff into water that
occurs perhaps miles away from the land that adjoins it.
There is no effective way, as yet other than land use control, by which you can intercept that runoff and control
it in the way that you do a point source. We have not yet
developed technology to deal with that kind of problem.
We need to find ways to deal with it, because a great quantity of pollutants is discharged by runoff, not only from
agriculture but from construction sites, from streets, from
parking lots, and so on, and we have to be concerned with
developing controls for them.23

19.

20.
21.
22.
23.

element, “point source,” because person is already included in the fifth element, “by any person”).
It is relatively common for courts, EPA, and commentators to distinguish
between point source pollution and nonpoint source pollution. See, e.g.,
League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v.
Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The issue before us is
whether spraying insecticide from an aircraft . . . is point source pollution
or nonpoint source pollution.”); Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 156 (“the point or
nonpoint character of pollution is established when the pollutant first enters navigable water”). This conflates point source with pollution. Although
“pollution” is defined in §502(19), 33 U.S.C. §1362(19), it is not an element of the CWA §301(a) offense. Indeed, it is quite distinguishable from
“pollutant,” which is an element.
“From” was treated as an element or close to it in Peconic Baykeeper, 600
F.3d at 188-90; Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 174-75.
H.R. 11896, §502(15), H. Rep. No. 92-911, Nov. 19, 1971. See also S.
2770, §502(p), S. Rep. No. 92-414, Oct. 28, 1971.
33 U.S.C. §1316(a).
117 Cong. Rec. 38805 (Nov. 2, 1971), reprinted in 2 A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
[hereinafter 2 Legis. History], available at http://catalog.hathitrust.org/
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The “discharge standard” to which Senator Muskie
referred is the set of uniform national technology-based
standards that the CWA required EPA to promulgate for
industrial and municipal point sources under §§301(b),
304(b)-(d), and 306.24 His statement does not draw a crisp
line between point sources and nonpoint sources and does
not define nonpoint sources. Nevertheless, it makes several
suggestions that may be useful in dealing with the point
source/nonpoint source distinction. First, point sources
typically are susceptible to pollution control by end-of-pipe
technology using uniform national standards, while nonpoint sources typically are not.25 Instead, nonpoint sources
are usually susceptible to land use and management controls, which are typically site-specific.26 Second, nonpoint
sources are associated with stormwater runoff. Third, agricultural stormwater runoff is typically nonpoint sourcerelated. Fourth, nonpoint sources are to a great extent from
agriculture, construction sites, streets, and parking lots.
Finally, when Senator Muskie stated that we have “not yet”
developed technologies to control nonpoint sources and
“need to,” he suggested that as we gradually develop such
technologies for different categories of nonpoint sources,
those categories should become point sources and be regulated by the CWA’s permit program.27
Senator Muskie’s statement raises as many questions as
it answers. Why cannot runoff be effectively intercepted
and controlled? We routinely intercept and convey it with
ditches. Moreover, we can also treat it to remove pollutants.
The problem is that the great volume of stormwater often
makes treatment not cost effective. His assertion that nonpoint sources are associated with runoff reminds us that
flows are not conveyances, the exceptions in the definition
of point source notwithstanding. His assertion that nonpoint sources are specifically associated with agricultural
runoff is inconsistent with the definition’s inclusion of
CAFOs in its list of examples of point sources. What does
the third sentence mean? Stormwater runoff will not flow
uncounted miles to a stream. Instead, it will percolate into
the ground, evaporate into the air, or flow into the closest

24.
25.

26.

27.

Record/001515679 (statement of Senator Muskie also available at http://
abacus.bates.edu/muskie-archives/ajcr/1971/CWA%20Beall%20Query.
shtml).
33 U.S.C. §§1311(b), 1314(b)-(d).
Pollutants discharged from nonpoint sources can be controlled by end-ofpipe technology. The polluted water flowing from many nonpoint sources
can be collected and treated, such as stormwater runoff in municipal storm
sewers. But such collection and treatment may be very expensive because of
the large volumes involved. For the same reason, treatment of stormwaters
to the same levels as treatment of municipal sewage may not be economically feasible. Management techniques may lower pollutant levels at less cost,
such as street sweeping, retention ponds for parking lot runoff, green roofs,
minimizing paved-over areas, and making paving less impervious.
Permits for point sources generally incorporate effluent limitations reflecting technology-based standards or water quality standards, rather than land
use or management controls. Nonetheless, they may use best management
practices to control runoff from factories, spills, and raw material storage
areas. CWA §304(e). Moreover, industries must control runoff from areas
where it comes into contact with industrial pollutants. CWA §402(p).
One court declared it clear from the legislative history that Congress “would
have regulated so-called nonpoint sources if a workable method could have
been derived.” United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373, 9
ELR 20542 (10th Cir. 1979).

12-2015

remote tributary of the stream. Perhaps, the senator had in
mind the suggestion by Rep. Teno Roncalio (D-Wyo.) in
the context of irrigation return flows, rather than stormwater, that “[i]t is virtually impossible to trace pollutants
to specific irrigation lands, making these pollutants a
nonpoint source in most cases.”28 Irrigation canals often
flow for miles between many irrigated farms, accumulating silt, fertilizer, pesticides, and other pollutants from all
of them, so that when the much-reused irrigation water is
eventually discharged to navigable water, it is difficult if
not impossible to trace specific pollutants in the discharge
back to particular farms. But Representative Roncalio’s
statement is not particularly helpful either; the definition
of point source does not mention or suggest traceability.29
Moreover, while it may be impossible to determine from
a sample taken at the discharge of an irrigation ditch or
canal what pollutants particular farms contributed to the
discharge, it is quite possible to make that determination
by sampling where the irrigation water is diverted to and
discharged from each farm. It may also be possible to identify fertilizers and pesticides in a discharge by chemically
fingerprinting them to fertilizers and pesticides used on
particular farms.
Sen. Robert Dole (R-Kan.) reiterated the nonpoint
nature of agricultural pollution. “Very simply,” he stated
(unknowingly ironic, as we shall see below), a nonpoint
source of pollution is one that “does not confine its polluting discharge to one fairly specific location, such as a
sewer pipe, a drainage ditch, or a conduit. In the area of
agricultural pollution, a feedlot would generally be considered to be a nonpoint source as would pesticide and fertilizer runoff and accumulation.”30 It is not clear whether he
is making a distinction based on the difference between
point sources and nonpoint sources or on the difference
between agricultural pollutants, such as pesticide and fertilizer runoff, and other pollutants. His observation that
feedlots are nonpoint sources is demonstratively incorrect. CAFOs are included in the §502(14) list of examples
of point sources. Perhaps, Senator Dole was alluding to
smaller CAFOs. Senator Muskie commented that natural runoff from small CAFOs is not a point source, unless
either the CAFO raises more than specified numbers of
animals or is traversed by a stream.31 If the CAFO is traversed by a stream, it is easy to understand how it conveys
animal waste to the stream and it therefore could be a point
source. If, however, a stream does not traverse the CAFO,
28. 118 Cong. Rec. 10765 (Mar. 29, 1972), reprinted in 1 A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
[hereinafter 1 Legis. History], available at http://catalog.hathitrust.org/
Record/001515679.
29. But see League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountain Biodiversity Project
v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002) (nonpoint sources “are
identified by three characteristics,” including “(2) The pollutants discharged
are not traceable to any distinct or identifiable facility. . . .”).
30. 2 Legis. History 1294; also included in his supplemental views published
with S. Rep. No. 92-404, pp. 98-99 (1971), reprinted in 2 Legis. History
1513-14.
31. 2 Legis. History 1299. “1,000 beef cattle; 700 dairy cows; 290,000 broiler
chickens; 180,000 laying hens, etc.” In its regulatory definition of a CAFO,
EPA copied this “poop equivalency table.” 40 C.F.R. §122.23.
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it is more difficult to understand how the CAFO is a conveyance of the waste, as opposed to the source of the waste.
In either event, the statute does not distinguish between
small and large CAFOs, although EPA’s regulations do.32
So much for Senator Dole’s “very simply.”
Senators Dole and Muskie entered into a colloquy on
the Senate floor that reiterated many of these points. Senator Dole asked “to what sort of guidance are we to look for
further clarification of the terms ‘point source’ and ‘nonpoint source’—especially as related to agriculture?” Senator Muskie replied that such guidance
will be provided in regulations and guidelines of the
[EPA] Administrator. The present policy with respect to
the identification of agricultural point sources is generally
as follows:
First. If a man-made drainage ditch, flushing system or
other such device is involved and if measurable waste
results and is discharged into water, it is considered a
“point source.”
Second. Natural runoff from confined livestock and poultry operations are not considered a “point source” unless
the following concentrations of animals are exceeded . . .
Third. Any feedlot operation which results in the direct
discharge of wastes into a stream which traverses the feedlot are considered point sources without regard to the
number of animals involved.33

C.

The CWA’s Structure: Point Source/Nonpoint
Source Distinction

One court has commented that the “disparate treatment
of discharges from point sources and nonpoint sources is
an organizational paradigm” of the CWA.34 Examination
of the CWA’s point source and nonpoint source programs
may help to better frame the distinction between point
sources and nonpoint sources.

1.

Regulation of Point Sources

Point sources may not add pollutants to navigable waters
without a §402 or §404 permit. EPA issues §402 permits
and must approve submitted state programs for permit issuance if they are comparable to the federal program. Section
402 permits contain effluent limitations based on technology-based standards35 and water quality standards.36 The
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) issues §404 permits, although EPA must approve submitted state programs
32. 40 C.F.R. §122.23. CAFOs are discussed in greater detail below.
33. 1971 Cong. Rec. 38816 (Nov. 2, 1971), reprinted in 2 Legis. History 1298-99; also available at http://abacus.bates.edu/muskie-archives/
ajcr/1971/CWA%20Dole%20Query.shtml.
34. Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 550 F.3d 778, 780, 39
ELR 20297 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoted in Friends of the Everglades v. South
Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. 570 F.3d 1210, 1227, 39 ELR 20118 (11th Cir.
2009).
35. CWA §§301(b)(2) & 304(b); 33 U.S.C. §§1311(b)(2) & 1314(b).
36. CWA §§303 & 304(a); 33 U.S.C. §§1313 & 1314(a).
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comparable to the federal program for permit issuance in
all but traditionally navigable waters. Section 404 permits
authorize the filling of wetlands, with limitations on how
much of a wetland may be filled and perhaps requiring
mitigation, such as providing replacement wetlands. EPA
oversees state administration of §402 programs, may veto
proposed state permits if they are not in compliance with
federal requirements, may enforce against violations of
state-issued permits, and may withdraw approval of state
§402 programs. EPA similarly oversees Corps and state
administration of §404 programs. (For brevity, this Article
refers to EPA actions in developing, issuing, and enforcing
permits, although such actions may be taken by the Corps
or by states with EPA-approved programs.)
The most important condition in a §402 permit is that
the point source cannot discharge pollutants in excess of
the permit’s effluent limitations (usually expressed numerically) for each pollutant it regulates. All effluent limitations must require the pollution reduction accomplished
by the best technology for the particular type of facility
at issue.37 EPA regulations establish effluent guidelines
on an industry-by-industry basis that permit writers can
easily translate into effluent limitations for each regulated
facility. The effluent guideline regulations are based on the
best-performing pollution reduction technologies used or
capable of being used by each category or subcategory of
industry. However, if that pollution reduction is insufficient to ensure attainment or maintenance of concentrations or other criteria for pollutants necessary to achieve
the state designated use of the receiving water, then the
permit must require greater pollution reduction to achieve
such water quality standards.38 Permit holders must sample
and analyze their effluents to determine whether they comply with the effluent limitations in the permits and must
report the results to EPA and the state, where the reports
are public information.39 EPA, the state, and private citizens may enforce against violations.40

2.

Regulation of Nonpoint Sources

As discussed below, EPA acknowledges that nonpoint
sources have long been the leading cause of water quality
problems. Sections 208 and later 31941 encouraged states
37. CWA §301(a) specifies criteria for industrial best available control technology for toxic pollutants, best available control technology for conventional pollutants, and best available control technology for other pollutants.
Section 306 also specifies criteria for best available control technology for
new sources. EPA uses these criteria to promulgate regulations by industrial
categories (for example, the organic chemicals and canning industries) and
subcategories (such as particular fruits and vegetables in the canning industry) under §§301(b)(2) and 304(b). EPA separately established technologybased standards to be met by publicly owned treatment works (POTWs), as
municipal sewage treatment plants are known among water pollution control cognoscenti, §§301(b)(1)(B) and 304(d)(1). These are performancebased standards. They do not require permittees to install particular technologies, only to remove pollutants comparable to the removal achieved by
the best control technologies.
38. CWA §§301(b)(1)(B) & 304(d)(1).
39. Id. §308.
40. Id. §§309 & 505.
41. 33 U.S.C. §§1288 & 1329.
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to establish programs and requirements for controlling
nonpoint sources and provided initial funding for them to
do so, but neither section defined nonpoint sources. Section 208 primarily required regional planning authorities
to ensure that federal grant funds were spent on construction of wastewater treatment plants whose locations and
capacities were efficient and reflected expected regional
growth. Secondarily, §208 encouraged regional planning
authorities to develop best management plans and state
and local enforcement mechanisms to control pollution
from the nonpoint sources for which EPA was to develop
best management practices under §304(f). Section 208,
however, lacked the structural mechanisms necessary for
long-term effectiveness. It provided no mechanism for EPA
to approve the adequacy of nonpoint programs developed
by regional authorities or states. It provided no mechanism for EPA or citizens to force an uncooperative state to
develop nonpoint source programs. It provided no mechanism for EPA or citizens to enforce against violations of
a nonpoint source plan. It provided no mechanism for
requiring EPA to develop a nonpoint source plan if a state
does not. Finally, it did not provide for long-term funding
for the state nonpoint source control programs. On top of
these structural deficiencies, the regional planning organizations envisioned by §208 often were not parts of the state
water pollution control authorities that the CWA expected
to implement the statutes’ permitting and publicly owned
treatment works (POTWs) construction grant programs.
Many of the state authorities viewed the regional planning
organizations as potential rivals for power and funding and
sought to undercut them. The combination of structural
shortcomings and political feuding sounded the death
knell of the program.
The 1972 statute required state water quality standards
to be achieved by 1977.42 Because the CWA included no
enforceable program to control nonpoint source pollution, it is unsurprising that many segments of navigable
waters had not achieved state-established water quality
standards by that date or subsequently,43 despite the fact
that most industries and municipalities achieved the first
required levels of their technology-based standards by that
date or shortly thereafter.44 In 1987, Congress responded
to the failure to achieve water quality standards by adding
§319 to the statute. The new section required states to sub42. CWA §301(b)(1)(C).
43. According to EPA’s 2004 report to Congress on water quality:
about 44% of assessed stream miles, 64% of assessed lake acres,
and 30% of assessed bay and estuarine square miles were not clean
enough to support such uses as fishing and swimming. Leading
causes for impairment included pathogens, mercury, nutrients, and
organic enrichment/low dissolved oxygen. Top sources of impairment included atmospheric deposition, agriculture, hydrologic
modifications and unknown or unspecified sources.
The report is available at http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/cwa/309_
cl_22_305b_2004report-factsheet2004305b.pdf.
44. Of the approximately 4,000 major industrial point sources, all except approximately 860 achieved their first level of pollution control by 1979, although only one-half of the 4,000 major POTWs did so. See Testimony
of Marvin Durning, U.S. EPA Assistant Administrator for Enforcement,
Before the Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution of the Committee on
Environment and Public Works, May 24, 1979, Serial No. 96-H16.
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mit reports identifying both segments of navigable waters
unable to achieve water quality standards without controls
on nonpoint sources and what types of nonpoint sources
must be controlled to achieve water quality standards.45 It
also required states to establish programs imposing best
management practices on nonpoint sources to achieve
water quality standards in those segments.46 If a state fails
to submit the initial report, EPA must develop a report.47
But if the state fails to submit the ultimate nonpoint source
control program, the section provides the Agency with
no authority to do so. The section does not provide either
EPA or citizens with authority to force states to develop
best management practices plans for nonpoint sources.
While §319 goes beyond §308 in focusing on nonpoint
sources, it too lacks the structural mechanism for longterm effectiveness.48
Section 304(f) mentions nonpoint sources in its title,
but not in its text. The text directed EPA to develop best
management practices for several categories of activities:
agricultural and silvicultural activities, including runoff
from fields and forests; mining activities, including runoff
from active and abandoned mines; construction activities, including runoff; deep well injection and subsurface
disposal of wastes49; salt water intrusion50; and changes
in water movement caused by dams, flow diversions, and
other such structures.51 Although some of these categories of activities center on nonpoint sources, others involve
what could be either point sources or nonpoint sources,
and some involve only point sources. Deep well injection, subsurface waste disposal, and salt water intrusion
all use wells, and wells are on the statutory list of point
source examples. These activities, however, usually inject
pollutants into groundwater, which is generally not considered to be navigable. Salt water intrusion results from
withdrawal of freshwater in coastal areas and usually does
not involve a discharge to surface water. Dams are usually
45.
46.
47.
48.

CWA §319(a).
Id. §319(b).
Id. §319(d).
Oliver A. Houck, The Clean Water Act TMDL Program: Law, Policy
& Implementation (2d ed. 2000.) For the latest round of total maximum
daily load (TMDL) litigation, see American Farm Bureau Fed’n v. U.S. EPA,
No. 13-4079, 2015 WL 4069224, 45 ELR 20129 (3d Cir. July 6, 2015).
49. Deep well injection and injection into subsurface areas are waste disposal
methods regulated by the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 42 U.S.C.
§§300f to 300j-26, ELR Stat. SDWA §§1401-1465, and the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§6901-6992k, ELR
Stat. RCRA §§1001-11011. Since these methods dispose of wastes through
a well, which is included as an example of a point source in the CWA’s definition of the term, it is odd to categorize them as nonpoint sources. Despite
some initial uncertainty, they are not regulated by the CWA because they
discharge to groundwater, which is not navigable water under either the
statute or common understanding of that term. See Jeffrey G. Miller, Plain
Meaning, Precedent, and Metaphysics: Interpreting the “Navigable Waters” Element of the Clean Water Act Offense, 45 ELR 10548, 10573-78 (June 2015).
50. Excessive withdrawal of groundwater from aquifers near the seacoast allows
salt water to replace the freshwater withdrawn, contaminating the remaining freshwater aquifer.
51. This Article examines dams, concluding they are point sources. Flow diversions are not subject to §402 regulation because they add nothing to navigable waters, but withdraw water from navigable waters for use elsewhere.
When the used water is later returned to navigable water, it may be subject
to §402 regulation.
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point sources, as are the pipes, pumps, and ditches that
accomplish water diversions.
This subsection does not define nonpoint sources, but
reflects Congress’ desire to have EPA focus on these particular pollution sources and develop solutions to them
without creating serious new federal regulatory programs.
Congress did not attempt in the subsection to draw distinctions between point and nonpoint sources. Indeed,
the subsection overlaps to some extent with the regulatory
programs Congress developed for point sources. The U.S.
Supreme Court recognized in South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida
that by addressing flow diversion facilities, §304(f) did not
make them nonpoint sources, “if they also fall within the
‘point source’ definition.”52 In conclusion, this subsection
again suggests Congress did not or could not articulate a
strict line between point sources and nonpoint sources, but
recognized that water quality could not be protected without moving beyond the regulation of point sources.
The CWA does not disregard nonpoint source discharges. But while its regulation of point sources is robust,
uniform, and effective, its regulation of nonpoint sources
is hortatory, haphazard, and of dubious effectiveness. That
difference in regulatory effectiveness does not mirror the
relative importance of point and nonpoint sources to the
quality of the nation’s water: Nonpoint sources discharge
more pollutants than point sources. The CWA’s failure to
deal effectively with nonpoint sources is its most significant
failure and the primary reason we have not achieved water
quality standards 40 years after enactment of the statute.
EPA could ameliorate this difficulty by amending its definition of “point source” from time to time to include former
categories of nonpoint sources for which technology-based
treatment standards had become available.

3.

Regulation of Stormwater and Storm Sewers

After the enactment of the CWA, EPA and states with
approved §402 programs were faced with the enormous
task of issuing permits to more than 60,000 point source
permit applicants within a fairly short period.53 They lacked
52. 541 U.S. 95, 106, 34 ELR 20021 (2004). Courts earlier had rejected arguments by industry that designation of an activity for development of nonpoint source best management practices in §304(f ) exempted the activity
from regulation of a point source under §402. United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 372, 23 ELR 21526 (10th Cir. 1979).
53. Congress enacted the CWA in October, 1972. It provided in §301(a) that
the discharge of pollutants without a permit was illegal, but granted immunity until the end of 1974 to permit applicants for whom permits had
not yet been issued. See §402(k). Thus, the statute indicates that Congress
contemplated EPA would issue all permits by that date. EPA had not previously undertaken a task of this magnitude. The effluent guidelines that
were to help permit writers devise effluent limitations for industrial sources
were not yet promulgated; once they were, those guidelines were subjected
to judicial review. Once permits were issued, many permit holders appealed
their terms. EPA concentrated on issuing permits to applicants it classified
as “major” point sources, that is, 15% of the applicants EPA considered to
be discharging the vast majority of pollutants from point sources, based on
the amounts of pollutant discharges reported in permit applications and
on state evaluations of their adverse impact on local water quality. As of
the end of 1975, EPA reported that of the 62,118 point sources requiring
§402 permits, 9,259 were “major sources.” U.S. EPA, EPA Enforcement: A
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the time or resources to address stormwater and many
minor point sources.54 At the same time, EPA was making grants to cities and towns across the country to build
secondary treatment plants,55 often providing sewage treatment for the first time. The Agency’s construction grant
program did not want to spend its limited resources making grants to deal with municipal storm sewers until all cities had secondary treatment. Thus, EPA’s two largest water
programs and their state counterparts were united in not
wanting to address municipal storm sewers or runoff at all,
or at least not until sometime in the indefinite future. As
a result, EPA promulgated a regulation exempting stormwater flows and sewers from the §402 permit program, an
exemption soon reversed as beyond EPA’s authority, discussed in greater detail in Section III, below.
In 1987, Congress entered the fray by amending the
CWA to add in §402(p) a program for gradually permitting municipal and industrial storm sewers. The provision began with a curiously worded statement in §402(p)
(1) that “[p]rior to October 1, 1994, the Administrator . . .
shall not require a permit under this section for discharges
composed entirely of stormwater.” Under §301(a), it is the
CWA, not the Administrator, that requires a permit for
a “discharge of any pollutant.” And what is a discharge
“composed entirely of stormwater”? Does that include
only dischargers of stormwater carrying pollutants? If
so, §301(a) already forbids it, except for the agricultural
stormwater flow exemption in §502(14). If not, then the
provision is meaningless, for a discharge without a permit
of pollutant-free water does not violate §301(a). The provision in §402(p)(2) exempts from the temporary exemption
several categories of “stormwater discharges,” including
discharges “associated with industrial activity” and from
“municipal separate stormwater sewer systems” serving
specified populations. Interpreted together, §402(p)(1) and
(2) appear to require industrial stormwater dischargers
and municipal separate sewer dischargers to apply for and
secure permits on schedules established in §402(p)(4) and
to exempt them from the requirement of having a permit
in the meantime. Those subsections also appear to exempt
other discharges of stormwater with pollutants from the
requirement to have a permit until October 1, 1994, but
not thereafter. The Court in Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center,56 however, seems to read “[p]rior
Progress Report December 1974 to December 1975 89-90 (1976). By the end
of 1975, EPA and states with approved §402 permit programs had issued
permits to all but 671 of the major sources and most of the remainder were
either new additions to the list of major sources, or had §402 permits issued by states with approved programs, but which those states deemed not
to be final until outstanding appeals were resolved. Id. EPA permit writers
simply did not have the resources or time to address the far more numerous
stormwater point sources, few if any of which discharged as many pollutants as major sources.
54. Decker v. Northwest Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1331-21, 43 ELR
20062 (2013).
55. Secondary treatment was the preferred treatment for municipal sewage. It
constituted primary treatment by settling and secondary treatment by biological methods, usually followed by chlorination or another treatment for
pathogens. Such facilities normally removed 85% of settleable solids and
biological oxygen demand.
56. 133 S. Ct. 1326, 43 ELR 20062 (2013).
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to October 1, 1994” out of the provision, perhaps because
EPA extended the exemption in the absence of a finding
that the discharge must be controlled to meet water quality standards, although the decision did not mention this
regulation.57 This issue will be discussed further below.

4.

Point Source/Nonpoint Source Distinction
Left Unclear

The statutory definition of point source, the structure of
the statute, and the legislative history of the statute, separately or collectively, do not draw a bright line between
point sources and nonpoint sources. EPA has not helped to
clarify the distinction by regulation and may have muddied
the waters further. We are left with a few hypotheses from
the above material. Industrial and municipal waste water
discharges are typically by point sources, while agricultural discharges are typically by nonpoint sources. Stormwater runoff is presumed to be discharged by nonpoint
sources, but may be discharged through point sources if
it is collected and channeled by man. Pollution from point
sources is susceptible to end-of-pipe technology for pollution control, while pollution from nonpoint source pollution is more appropriately dealt with by land use controls
or management practices. This is a rationale for subjecting
point source pollution to the permit programs with nationally uniform technology-based standards and nonpoint
sources to site-specific best management practices with no
permit program. A corollary is that as end-of-pipe technology becomes available for particular categories of nonpoint
sources, it would be appropriate to include those categories
within the definition of point source to be regulated by the
statute’s permit systems.
None of these distinctions is entirely satisfactory. Stormwater runoff can be collected and be treated with end-ofpipe technology. Indeed, CWA §402(p) subjects much
municipal and industrial stormwater runoff to the §402
point source permit program to do just that.58 Moreover,
agricultural runoff can be point source pollution. CAFOs,
for instance, are included in the statutory definition of
point sources. While it may be assumed that there is a
clear divide between point source discharges and nonpoint
stormwater runoff, that clarity is deceiving. When stormwater is collected and channeled by human activities, it is
discharged from point sources and may be regulated by
§402 permits.59 Finally, many nonpoint sources, such as
people and animals, have nothing to do with runoff.

III. Administrative Interpretations of Point
Source
EPA’s national pollutant discharge elimination system
(NPDES) regulations in Title 40 of the Code of Federal
Regulations define point source almost identically with
57. 40 C.F.R. §122.6(a)(9)(i).
58. 33 U.S.C. §342(p).
59. 40 C.F.R. §122.2 (definition of “discharge of a pollutant”).
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the CWA’s definition of the term. EPA’s definition adds
“landfill leachate collection system” at the end of the list
of examples of point sources. And, in the exemption, it
reverses “return flows from irrigated agriculture” and “agricultural stormwater discharges” and substitutes “runoff”
for “discharges,” making the exception read “return flows
from irrigated agriculture and agricultural stormwater
runoff.” EPA probably made the last change because “point
source” is an element of “discharge,” making the inclusion of “discharge” as part of a listed exception to “point
source” circular. Why EPA added only “landfill leachate
collection system” to the list of point source examples is a
mystery, for there are many other conveyances that could
be added to the list. Moreover, discharges from leachate
collection systems would probably be from point sources
without the addition.60 EPA’s definition ends with “(See
122.3),” a phrase Congress could not have included in
its definition of “point source.” Section 122.3 is entitled
“Exclusions” and excludes a number of large categories of
discharges61 from the requirement to secure §402 permits,
even though they otherwise would constitute additions of
pollutants to navigable waters from point sources. This is a
curious provision.
EPA’s definition of point source is augmented by the last
portion of its definition of “discharge of a pollutant” in
§122.2, which includes “surface runoff which is collected
or channeled by man.”62 EPA’s implementing regulations
at 40 C.F.R. §122.26 also require treatment of industrial
storm sewers carrying stormwater that comes into contact
with industrial wastes and lesser, phased requirements for
municipal storm sewers.
Early in its implementation of the §402 permit program,
EPA promulgated a rule exempting several categories of
point sources from the requirement of securing permits:
60. If a leachate collection system was discharging directly to navigable water, it
would in all probability be through a pipe, already defined as a point source.
If it was pumped to a tank truck for disposal elsewhere, tank trucks are held
to be point sources.
61. Discharges of (a) sewage from vessels; (b) dredged and fill material regulated
under CWA §404; (c) sewage and other pollutants into POTWs by indirect
dischargers; (d) material in compliance with instructions of On-Scene Coordinators under 40 C.F.R. pt. 300; (e) pollutants from nonpoint source agricultural and silvicultural activities except as otherwise provided; (f ) return
flows from irrigated agriculture; (g) waste from privately owned treatment
works, and (h) material from water transfers. This list of exclusions is vastly
oversimplified, for most of the exclusions are significantly qualified. The
exclusion for agricultural and silvicultural activities, for example, includes
storm water runoff from orchards, cultivated crops, pastures, range
lands, and forest lands, but not discharges from concentrated animal
feeding operations as defined in §122.23, discharges from concentrated aquatic animal production facilities as defined in §122,24,
discharges to aquacultural projects as defined in §122.25, and discharges from silvicultural point sources as defined in §122.27.
62. It also includes “discharges through pipes, sewers, or other conveyances
owned by a State, municipality, or other person which do not lead to a
treatment works; and discharges through pipes, sewers or other conveyances
leading into privately owned treatment works,” but not discharges by indirect dischargers into POTWs. It then defines an “indirect discharger” as
a “nondomestic discharger” introducing “pollutants” to a “publicly owned
treatment works.” In the preamble, EPA stated its intent to incorporate the
“broadest possible definition of point source consistent with the legislative
intent.” 55 Fed. Reg. 47990 (Nov. 16, 1990), quoted in Washington Wilderness Coal. v. Hecla Mining Co., 870 F. Supp. 983, 988, 25 ELR 20661
(E.D. Wash. 1994).
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all silvicultural point sources; all confined animal
feeding operations below a certain size; all irrigation
return flows areas less than 3,000 contiguous acres or
3,000 noncontiguous acres that use the same drainage
system; all nonfeedlot, nonirrigated agricultural point
sources; and separate storm sewers containing only
storm water uncontaminated by any industrial or commercial activity.63

Environmentalists challenged EPA’s regulation as
beyond the Agency’s statutory authority. The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia (D.C.) Circuit
agreed, holding in Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. Costle that EPA had no authority to exempt point
sources discharging pollutants to navigable waters from
the permit program.64 The court did suggest, however,
that the Agency had authority to define point sources,
and subsequent courts have agreed.65 EPA followed the
court’s suggestion by promulgating rules defining stormwater flow point sources,66 CAFO point sources,67 silviculture point sources,68 and aquacultural point sources.69
The new definition did not include many of the discharges exempted by the overturned rule and therefore
remain excluded from the §402 program. Courts have
held, however, that the rules are valid exercises of EPA’s
definitional authority rather than invalid attempts to
exempt point source discharges from the permit program.70 Thus, Costle was a pyrrhic victory for the environmental plaintiffs.
EPA made no attempt in its permit program regulations
to define nonpoint source. The Agency has made some
attempt to do so elsewhere, however. In its web page on
nonpoint source, EPA states that “nonpoint source pollution generally results from land runoff, precipitation,
drainage, seepage or hydrologic modification. The term
‘nonpoint source’ is defined to mean any source of water
pollution that does not meet the legal definition of ‘point
source’ in section 502(14) of the Clean Water Act.”71 The
Agency continues:
Nonpoint source (NPS) pollution, unlike pollution from
industrial and sewage treatment plants, comes from many
diffuse sources. NPS pollution is caused by rainfall or
snowmelt moving over and through the ground. As the
runoff moves, it picks up and carries away natural and
63. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1372-73, 8 ELR
20028 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The regulation is found at 40 C.F.R. §125.4
(1975).
64. 568 F.2d 1369, 8 ELR 20028 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
65. Id. at 1372. Subsequent courts agreeing include United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 372, 23 ELR 21526 (10th Cir. 1979); Wild Fish
Conservancy v. Quilcene Nat’l Fish Hatchery, 2009 WL 3380655 (W.D.
Wash. 2009); and U.S. Public Interest Research Grp. v. Atlantic Salmon of
Maine, Inc., LLC, 215 F. Supp. 2d 239, 249, 32 ELR 20535 (D. Me. 2002).
66. 40 C.F.R. §122.26(b)(14).
67. Id. §122.23(c).
68. Id. §122.27.
69. Id. §122.24 & .25.
70. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368; Wild Fish Conservancy, 2009 WL
3380655.
71. See EPA’s web page, http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/nps/whatis.cfm.
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human-made pollutants, finally depositing them into
lakes, rivers, wetlands, coastal waters and ground waters.72

IV.

Judicial Interpretations of Point Source

A.

Preliminary Matters

It should be emphasized at the outset that the CWA does not
authorize EPA to regulate a point source, but only to regulate the discharge of any pollutant, of which “point source”
is one of several elements. The Agency made the mistake of
promulgating regulations requiring CAFO point sources
to apply for CWA §402 permits regardless of whether the
CAFOs discharged pollutants. In National Pork Producers
Council v. U.S. EPA, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit struck this regulation as beyond the Agency’s
authority.73 Moreover, not all point sources require §402
permits, even if they add pollutants to navigable water. For
example, industries that discharge pollutants to POTWs
for treatment before discharge to navigable waters are held
to be point sources,74 but EPA’s regulations define them
as “indirect sources” and have exempted them from the
§402 permit program, subject instead to regulation under
the CWA §307(b) pretreatment program.75 Courts are also
in broad agreement that EPA has substantial authority to
define point sources.76 Perhaps, there is not as much need
for a broad interpretation for point sources as for the other
elements of the offense, however, because if the other ele72. See EPA’s web page, http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/nps/index.cfm. Also
useful are several EPA guidance documents quoted or cited in Cordiano v.
Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199, 220-21 (2d Cir. 2009).
73. 635 F.3d 738, 749-53, 41 ELR 20115 (5th Cir. 2011). See also Service Oil
Inc. v. EPA, 590 F.3d 545, 550, 40 ELR 20002 (8th Cir. 2009); Waterkeeper Alliance v. U.S. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 504, 35 ELR 20049 (2d Cir.
2005).
74. RSR Corp. v. Browner, 924 F. Supp. 504, 511, 26 ELR 21353 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), aff’d, No. 96-6186, 1997 WL 134413 (2d Cir. Mar. 26, 1997); affirmance vacated without explanation, No. 96-6186 (2d Cir. Apr. 17, 1997)
(defendant subject to EPA’s information demand authority over point
sources under CWA §308, 33 U.S.C. §1318, even though it was an indirect discharger to a POTW). See also U.S. EPA v. Green Forest, Ark., 921
F.2d 1394, 1398, 21 ELR 20610 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Velsicol
Chem. Corp., 438 F. Supp. 945, 946-47 (W.D. Tenn. 1976).
75. Assuming, that is, the discharge is into a municipal system providing treatment rather than into a storm sewer. Title 40 C.F.R. §122.2 defines “discharge of a pollutant” to exclude addition of pollutants by an “indirect
discharger,” which it in turn defines as a nondomestic discharger introducing pollutants to a “publicly owned treatment works.” See also 40 C.F.R.
§122.3(c), which excludes indirect dischargers from the requirement to secure a §402 permit. The reason EPA excludes indirect dischargers from the
permit program is that CWA §307(b) requires indirect dischargers to pretreat their wastes before discharging them to POTWs to prevent them from
interfering with the POTWs or to allow the indirect sources’ wastes to pass
through the POTW untreated. The section also requires indirect sources
to treat their wastes meeting technology-based standards to remove toxic
pollutants. Finally, CWA §402(b)(8) and (9) contemplate that POTWs will
regulate indirect discharges by permits or other means to require compliance with both the interference and pass-through prohibitions and the toxic
pollutant pretreatment standards. See also EPA’s pretreatment program regulations at 40 C.F.R. pt. 403.
76. This was first recognized by Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d
1369, 1377, 8 ELR 20028 (D.C. Cir. 1978), which held that EPA could
not exempt point sources adding pollutants to navigable water from the
§402 permit program, but had broad discretion to define point source. See
also United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 372, 23 ELR 21526
(10th Cir. 1979).
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ments are not met, then the discharge escapes CWA jurisdiction altogether, but if the point source element is not
met, then the discharge may still be under CWA jurisdiction as a nonpoint source.
Finally, a number of courts have held that conveyances
are point sources only if they are the origins of the pollutants, that is, they convey the pollutants from their point
of origin. This idea was first espoused by EPA in National
Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, where the Agency argued
that there is an addition of a pollutant from a point source
“only if the point source itself physically introduces a pollutant into water from the outside world.”77 The D.C.
Circuit gave deference to EPA’s interpretation. Although
the interpretation in that case concerned the meaning of
“addition,” it could just as well have been an interpretation
of “point source” as the first conveyance to introduce the
pollutant into water or at least into navigable water. The
Supreme Court decisively rejected this notion in Miccosukee Tribe, in which it held that “a point source need not be
the original source of the pollutant: it need only convey
the pollutant to navigable water.”78 Since Miccosukee Tribe,
courts have rejected the notion, as many did earlier.

B.

Held to Be Point Sources

Courts have held the following to be point sources: airplanes dropping bombs or spraying pesticides79; aquacultural facilities80; barges81; breaks in berms82; bulldozers,
cranes, dump trucks, loaders, plows, tractors, and other
construction and earth-moving equipment83; canals,
77. 693 F.2d 156, 175, 13 ELR 20015 (D.C. Cir. 1982), North Carolina Shellfish Growers Ass’n v. Holly Ridge Assocs., LLC, 278 F. Supp. 2d 654, 680
(E.D.N.C. 2003) (although CWA violations cannot result from purely passive developments on a defendant’s property, the active moving of land is
sufficient to trigger liability under the Act). Contra Sierra Club v. El Paso
Gold Mines, Inc., 421 F.3d 1133, 1145, 35 ELR 20175 (10th Cir. 2005)
(“This is a case where if you own the leaky ‘faucet,’ you are responsible for
its ‘drips.’”); Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1354-55, 21 ELR
21133 (2d Cir. 1991).
78. South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 541
U.S. 95, 105, 34 ELR 20021 (2004).
79. Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646, 664 (D.P.R. 1979), rev’d on
other grounds sub nom. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 643 F.2d 835, 11
ELR 20391 (1st Cir. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 456 U.S. 305, 12 ELR
20538 (1982); Peconic Baykeeper, Inc. v. Suffolk Cnty., 600 F.3d 180, 18889, 40 ELR 20098 (2d Cir. 2010); League of Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1183-85 (9th Cir. 2002).
80. U.S. Public Interest Research Grp. v. Atlantic Salmon of Maine, LLC, 215
F. Supp. 2d 239, 32 ELR 20535 (D. Me. 2002).
81. United States v. West Indies Transportation, Inc., 127 F.3d 299, 308-09, 28
ELR 20202 (3d Cir. 1997).
82. Reynolds v. Rick’s Mushroom Serv., Inc., 246 F. Supp. 2d 449 (E.D. Pa.
2003); O’Leary v. Moyer’s Landfill, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 642, 655, 12 ELR
20239 (E.D. Pa. 1981); United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Prods.,
Inc., 487 F. Supp. 852, 954, 10 ELR 20549 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
83. Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1009, 34 ELR 20104
(11th Cir. 2004); Borden Ranch P’ship v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 261
F.3d 810, 814, 32 ELR 20011 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d, 537 U.S. 99 (2002);
United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 726 n.6, 23 ELR 21012 (3d Cir.
1993); Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 922, 13
ELR 20942 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Lambert, 915 F. Supp. 797, 26
ELR 21116 (S.D. W. Va. 1996); United States v. Sinclair Oil, 767 F. Supp.
200, 21 ELR 21323 (D. Mont. 1990); United States v. Weisman, 489 F.
Supp. 1331, 1336-37, 10 ELR 20698 (M.D. Fla. 1980); United States v.
Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 668, 4 ELR 20710 (M.D. Fla. 1074).
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pumps, and levees84; collection pond and tank cracks, leaks,
bypasses, and overflows85; CAFOs86; construction sites87;
dams88; ditches89; entire facilities or industrial plants90;
facilities discharging to POTWs91; fields overflowing with
applied manure92; human beings93; manure spreaders94;
mine adits, shafts, pits, and tunnels95; mushroom-growing facilities96; overflowing collection and tailings ponds
and lagoons97; piles of debris, material, and waste rock98;
84. South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 541
U.S. 95, 34 ELR 20021 (2004); Friends of the Everglades v. South Fla.
Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210, 39 ELR 20118 (11th Cir. 2009).
85. Moyer’s Landfill 523 F. Supp. at 655.
86. National Pork Producers’ Council v. U.S. EPA, 635 F.3d 738, 41 ELR
20115 (5th Cir. 2010); Concerned Area Residents for Env’t v. Southview
Farm, 34 F.3d 114, 123, 24 ELR 21480 (3d Cir. 1994); Community Ass’n
for Restoration of Env’t v. Henry Bosma Dairy, Inc., 305 F.3d 943, 955
(9th Cir. 2002); Carr v. Alta Verde Industries, Inc., 931 F.2d 1055, 21 ELR
21005 (5th Cir. 1991); Assateague Coastkeeper v. Hudson Farm, 727 F.
Supp. 2d 433, 439-40, 40 ELR 20208 (D. Md. 2010).
87. North Carolina Shellfish Growers Ass’n v. Holly Ridge Assocs., 278 F. Supp.
2d 654, 679 (E.D.N.C. 2003); Molokai Chamber of Commerce v. Kukui,
891 F. Supp. 1389, 1401, 26 ELR 20303 (D. Haw. 1995).
88. S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 36 ELR 20089
(2006); Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 550 F.3d 778, 787
n.4, 39 ELR 20297 (9th Cir. 2008); Greenfield Mills, Inc. v. Macklin, 361
F.3d 934, 34 ELR 20022 (7th Cir. 2004); Committee to Save Mokelumne
River v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 13 F.3d 305, 24 ELR 20225 (9th Cir.
1993); National Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 165, 13 ELR
20015 (D.C. Cir. 1982); North Carolina Shellfish Growers, 278 F. Supp. 2d
at 679; South Carolina Wildlife Fed’n v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118, 126,
8 ELR 20757 (D.S.C. 1978); Del-Aware Unlimited v. Commissioner, Dep’t
of Envtl. Res., 96 Pa. Cmwlth. 361, 381-82 (Pa. 1986).
89. Henry Bosma Diary, 305 F.3d at 955; National Ass’n of Home Builders v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 699 F. Supp. 2d 209, 215-16, 40 ELR 20104
(D.D.C. 2010), vacated on other grounds, 663 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2011);
North Carolina Shellfish Growers, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 679; Environmental
Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pacific Lumber Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 803, 821, 37 ELR
20012 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
90. United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 23 ELR 21526 (10th
Cir. 1979); North Carolina Shellfish Growers, 278 F. Supp. 2d 654; Reynolds
v. Rick’s Mushroom Serv., Inc., 246 F. Supp. 2d 449 (E.D. Pa. 2003); Williams Pipeline Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1300, 1318-20 (S.D. Iowa
1997).
91. RSR Corp. v. Browner, 924 F. Supp. 504, 511, 26 ELR 21353 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
92. Concerned Area Residents for Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114, 11819, 24 ELR 21480 (3d Cir. 1994) (3d Cir. 2004); Henry Bosma Dairy, 305
F.3d at 955; Rick’s Mushroom Serv., 246 F. Supp. 2d at 456-57; United States
v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Prods., Inc., 487 F. Supp. 852, 854, 10 ELR
20549 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
93. United States v. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. 6, 8-11, 22 ELR 21027 (E.D.N.Y.
1991), rev’d sub nom. United States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643,
23 ELR 21526 (2d Cir. 1991).
94. League of Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d at 1184; Concerned
Area Residents, 34 F.3d 114 at 24; Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d at 955.
95. Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 421 F.3d 1133, 1441, 35 ELR
20175 (10th Cir. 2005); West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Huffman,
588 F. Supp. 2d 678, 39 ELR 20201 (S.D. W. Va. 2009), aff’d, 625 F.3d 159
(4th Cir. 2010); Beartooth Alliance v. Crown Butte Mines, 904 F. Supp.
1168, 1173-74, 26 ELR 20639 (D. Mont. 1995).
96. Reynolds v. Rick’s Mushroom Serv., Inc., 246 F. Supp. 2d 449 (E.D. Pa.
2003); Oxford Royal Mushroom Prods., Inc., 487 F. Supp. 852, 10 ELR
20549 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
97. Washington Wilderness Coal. v. Hecla Mining Co., 870 F. Supp. 983, 988,
25 ELR 20661 (E.D. Wash. 1994); Fishel v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 640
F. Supp. 442, 446, 16 ELR 20634 (M.D. Pa. 1986); O’Leary v. Moyer’s
Landfill, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 642, 655, 12 ELR 20239 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
98. Parker v. Scrap Metals Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1009, 34 ELR 20104
(11th Cir. 2004); Bravos v. EPA, 324 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 2003); Trustees
for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 558, 15 ELR 20146 (9th Cir. 1984); Sierra
Club v. Abston Constr. Co., Inc., 620 F.2d 41, 45, 10 ELR 20552 (5th Cir.
1980); United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 9 ELR 20542
(10th Cir. 1979); Washington Wilderness Coal., 870 F. Supp. at 988.
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pipes and hoses99; railway culverts100; rifle ranges101; septic systems102; sluice boxes103; spray apparatuses attached
to trucks and helicopters104; sump overflows105; systems for
circulating, channeling, or draining stormwater runoff 106;
toilets connected to storm sewers107; tank trucks108; trucks
with attached spreaders or sprayers109; and turbines.110

C.

Held Not to Be Point Sources

Courts have held the following not to be point sources:
agricultural runoff from farms and CAFO fields111; aquacultural facilities112; buildings storing trash113; cattle114;
dams115; human beings116; piles of coal and rock117; rifle

99. United States v. Lippold, 2007 WL 3232483 at **2-3 (C.D. Ill.
2007) (uncontested).
100. Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1355, 21 ELR 21133 (2d Cir.
1991).
101. Stone v. Naperville Park Dist., 38 F. Supp. 2d 651, 655 (N.D. Ill. 1999);
Long Island Soundkeeper Fund, Inc. v. New York Athletic Club, 1996 WL
131863 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
102. United States v. Agosto-Vega, 617 F.3d 541, 40 ELR 20222 (1st Cir. 2010);
United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 332, 38 ELR 20041 (5th Cir. 2008);
Friends of the Sakonnet v. Dutra, 738 F. Supp. 623, 629-30, 21 ELR 20055
(D.R.I. 1990).
103. Trustees, 749 F.2d at 558.
104. Peconic Baykeeper, Inc. v. Suffolk Cnty., 600 F.3d 180, 188-89, 40 ELR
20098 (2d Cir. 2010); National Cotton Council of Am. v. U.S. EPA, 553
F.3d 927, 39 ELR 20006 (6th Cir. 2009); League of Wilderness Defenders/
Blue Mountain Biodiversity Project v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir.
2002).
105. United States v. Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d 368, 374, 23 ELR 21526 (10th
Cir. 1979); Washington Wilderness Coal. v. Hecla Mining Co., 870 F.
Supp. 983, 987-89, 25 ELR 20661 (E.D. Wash. 1994).
106. Northwest Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 640 F.3d 1063, 1069-73, 41 ELR
20178 (9th Cir. 2011); Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Lewis, 638 F.3d 1143,
41 ELR 20059 (9th Cir. 2010); Carr v. Alta Verde Indust., Inc., 931 F.2d
1055, 21 ELR 21005 (5th Cir. 1991); Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co.,
Inc., 620 F.2d 41, 10 ELR 20552 (5th Cir. 1980); Sierra Club v. El Paso
Gold Mines, Inc., 421 F.3d 1133, 35 ELR 20175 (10th Cir. 2005); Environmental Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pacific Lumber Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 803, 37
ELR 20012 (N.D. Cal. 2007); North Carolina Shellfish Growers Ass’n v.
Holly Ridge Assocs., 278 F. Supp. 2d 654 (E.D.N.C. 2003).
107. United States v. Ortiz, 427 F.3d 1278, 35 ELR 20220 (10th Cir. 2005).
108. United States v. Agosto-Vega, 617 F.3d 541, 40 ELR 20222 (1st Cir. 2010)
(uncontested); Concerned Area Residents for Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34
F.3d 114, 24 ELR 21480 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Lippold, 2007
WL 3232483 at **2-3 (C.D. Ill. 2007) (uncontested).
109. League of Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir.
2002).
110. S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 36 ELR 20089
(2006); South Carolina Wildlife Fed’n v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118, 12627, 8 ELR 20757 (D.S.C. 1978).
111. National Pork Producers’ Council v. U.S. EPA, 635 F.3d 738, 41 ELR
20115 (5th Cir. 2011).
112. Association to Protect Hammersly, Eld, & Totten Inlets v. Taylor Res., Inc.,
299 F.3d 1007, 1018-19 (9th Cir. 2002); Wild Fish Conservancy v. Quilcene Natural Fish Hatchery, 2009 WL 3380655 (W.D. Wash. 2009).
113. Hudson Riverkeeper Fund, Inc. v. Harbor at Hastings Assocs., 917 F. Supp.
251, 257, 26 ELR 21120 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
114. Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 550 F.3d 788, 39 ELR
20297 (9th Cir. 2008).
115. Froebel v. Meyer, 217 F.3d 928, 30 ELR 20746 (7th Cir. 2000); National
Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 13 ELR 20015 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(dams may be point sources, but they do not add pollutants to downstream flows).
116. United States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 646, 23 ELR 21526
(2d Cir. 1993).
117. Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 6 ELR 20732 (4th Cir.
1976).
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ranges118; seeps from a swamp into groundwater119; silvicultural runoff120; toll booth stations on bridges121; and waste
pits with covers to minimize precipitation intrusion.122

D.

Easy Decisions, Difficult Decisions

The definition of “point source” as a “discernible, confined
and discrete conveyance” is a straightforward concept that
is easy to apply in most factual situations. Its list of examples is long and inclusive, creating a large set of per se point
sources. That set of point sources and conveyances analogous to them cover most obvious conveyances of pollutants
to navigable waters. Not surprisingly, more than one-half
of the courts interpreting point source reached their decisions easily, based on two or fewer interpretive devices or
two or fewer precedents.123 Few decisions conduct an indepth interpretation of point source because “any identifiable conveyance” will suffice.124 That is not the end of
the inquiry, however, since even clear point sources may
be subject to a statutory or regulatory exemption, such as
the exemption for “agricultural stormwater discharges.”125
The difficult cases are signaled when judicial decisions hold
similar discharges to be both point sources and nonpoint
sources, and when decisions use five or more interpretive
devices or cite five or more precedents to decide.126
The difficult decisions fall into two general categories.
One category involves whether human activity sufficiently
collects and channels pollutants in stormwater runoff for
the conveyance to be considered a point source; for example, runoff from rock and coal piles.127 The statutory history describes nonpoint sources solely in terms of runoff.
Therefore, under the legislative history, all conveyances of
pollutants would be point sources in the absence of stormwater runoff. But while a large number of decisions fall
into this first category, examining whether a conveyance
of runoff is a point source, most decisions fall into the second category, examining whether a conveyance is a point
source in cases where there is no runoff. In the latter cases,
118. Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2009) (insufficient proof to support allegations).
119. Williams Pipeline Co., v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1300, 1326 (S.D. Iowa
1997).
120. Decker v. Northwest Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 U.S. 1326, 43 ELR 20062
(2013).
121. U.S. EPA ex rel. McKeown v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 162 F. Supp. 2d
173, 188-89 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d sub nom. McKeown v. Delaware Bridge
Auth., 23 F. App’x 81 (2d Cir. 2001).
122. Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Lewis, 638 F.3d 1143, 1153, 41 ELR
20059 (9th Cir. 2010) (some discharges were point sources and others
nonpoint sources).
123. See infra tbl. B.
124. Peconic Baykeeper, Inc. v. Suffolk Cnty., 600 F.3d 180, 188, 40 ELR 20098
(2d Cir. 2010) (citing Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199,
219 (2d Cir. 2009)). Only about 10% of the decisions interpreting point
source use five or more canons of statutory construction and only about
20% use five or more precedents. See infra tbl. B.
125. CWA §502(14).
126. See infra tbl. B.
127. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., Inc., 620 F.2d 41, 44-47, 10
ELR 20552 (5th Cir. 1980) (may be point sources). But see Appalachian
Power v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1372-74, 6 ELR 20732 (4th Cir. 1976)
(may not be point sources).
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statutory history gives us no guidance beyond its general
admonition to interpret the statute broadly.
Most of the earliest opinions at both the federal district
court and circuit courts of appeal levels interpreting point
source were decided using a plain meaning analysis. As
soon as there were reported decisions on the issue, however, precedent became the most commonly used interpretive device. The third most commonly used interpretive
device was to interpret statutes broadly to effectuate the
statutory purpose. In all, 16 canons were used interpreting point source.128 More than one-half of the decisions
used only one or two interpretive devices, usually precedent and plain meaning or sometimes broad interpretation.
These were easy decisions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit decision in United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc. claimed a particularly broad reach for the term
to embrace “the broadest possible definition of any identifiable conveyance from which pollutants might enter the
waters of the United States,”129 which many decisions since
have quoted.130 And another court noted that EPA, in its
promulgation of the regulations for stormwater flow, “has
stated its intent ‘to embrace the broadest possible definition
of point source consistent with the legislative intent of the
CWA.’”131 Of course, there are bounds to broad interpretation, especially when Congress itself has articulated them,
as it did in the CWA by providing for nonpoint sources.132
The Article will analyze in turn the first category of difficult decisions, those involving precipitation runoff; the
second category of point source decisions, those having
nothing to do with runoff; and then suggest regulatory
definitions of point source and nonpoint source.

E.

Stormwater Runoff Decisions

1.

Runoff

Stormwater runoff is better described as precipitation runoff because it consists of the natural flow of both rain after
it hits the ground and the flow of snow, sleet, or ice after
they melt on the ground. Senator Muskie in his abovequoted statement said that agricultural runoff “is a nonpoint source.” Courts have also called runoff “nonpoint
pollution.”133 Both statements are inaccurate in terms of
statutory language and can confuse the interpretive anal128. See infra tbl. B.
129. 599 F.2d 368, 373, 23 ELR 21526 (10th Cir. 1979).
130. Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199, 219 (2d Cir. 2009);
Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1354, 21 ELR 21133 (2d Cir.
1991); United States v. West Indies Transp., Inc., 127 F.3d 299, 309, 28
ELR 20202 (3d Cir. 997).
131. Beartooth Alliance v. Crown Butte Mines, 904 F. Supp. 1168, 1173, 26
ELR 20639 (D. Mont. 1995) (quoting 55 Fed. Reg. 47990, 47997 (Nov.
16, 1990)). See also Washington Wilderness Coal. v. Hecla Mining Co., 870
F. Supp. 983, 988, 25 ELR 20661 (E.D. Wash. 1994).
132. The definition of point source “cannot be interpreted so broadly as to read
the point source requirement out of the statute,” Metacon Gun Club, 575
F.3d at 219. For a discussion of how Congress realized that some of the goals
in the CWA were unattainable and unrealistic, see National Wildlife Fed’n v.
Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 179-82, 13 ELR 20015 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
133. Northwest Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 640 F.3d 1063, 1076, 41 ELR 20178
(9th Cir. 2011); Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 177.
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ysis. For runoff to be a “nonpoint source,” stormwater
would have to be a non-conveyance or an indiscernible,
unconfined, and indiscrete conveyance. For runoff to be “a
nonpoint pollutant,” stormwater would have to be a “pollutant.” The statutory definitions of point source and pollutant, however, do not include stormwater itself; rather, it
is something that may be conveyed by a point source and
a medium in which a pollutant may be suspended and carried. Some courts have told us that roads are the prototypical nonpoint sources:
The most common example of nonpoint source pollution is the residue left on roadways by automobiles. Small
amounts of rubber are worn off of the tires of millions
of cars and deposited as a thin film on highways: minute particles of copper dust from brake linings are spread
across roads and parking lots each time a driver applies the
brakes; drips and drabs of oil and gas ubiquitously stain
driveways and streets. When it rains, the rubber particles
and copper dust and gas and oil wash off of the street and
are carried along by runoff in a polluted soup, winding up
in creeks, rivers, bays, and the ocean.134

Notice the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
is discussing nonpoint source pollution. The precipitation
here is natural. The road is not natural, nor are the pollutants. Is the road a conveyance? Vehicles traveling the road
are conveyances of passengers and goods. Does the road in
turn convey the vehicles? Not in the ordinary meaning of
convey or conveyance. Does the road convey the precipitation or the pollutants? Most roads are crowned so that
precipitation runs off to the side. Roads are defined, confined, and discrete as they run from one place to another,
but are they defined, confined, and discrete as they convey
stormwater runoff to their sides? Again, not in the ordinary meaning of convey or conveyance. Under this analysis, runoff from roads is not conveyed by the roads and the
roads are nonpoint sources.
But that is not the end of the analysis. Once runoff has
flowed off the roads, it often flows into roadside ditches,
designed to carry stormwater runoff to the nearest surface
water, often discharged from the ditches or culverts, both of
which are point sources.135 In the absence of ditches, roads
might flood and some of the runoff would flow to surface
waters, while some of it would percolate into the ground
and some of it would evaporate. Courts and EPA are fond of
citing roads as typical nonpoint sources,136 but their analyses are not complete. Their reasoning would keep roads
134. League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v.
Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2002); see also United States v.
Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 371, 23 ELR 21526 (10th Cir. 1979);
U.S. EPA ex rel. McKeown v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 162 F. Supp. 2d
173, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
135. “Ditches” are included in the list of examples of “point sources” in CWA
§502(14). Culverts have been held to be point sources, Dague, 935 F.2d
1354, not surprisingly since culverts are pipes that are the first example
of point sources listed in the statutory definition of point source, CWA
§502(14).
136. Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d at 371; Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 162 F. Supp. 2d at
189; Hecla, 870 F. Supp. at 988 (E.D. Wash. 1994). See also EPA’s web page
at http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/nps/roadshwys.
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out of the CWA §402 program, but not roadside drainage
ditches and culverts. After all, municipal storm sewers carry
stormwater runoff from street gutters to navigable waters
and municipal storm sewers are point sources that require
permits under §402(p). EPA has exempted such flows from
the requirement to secure §402 permits, however, as long as
they are composed “entirely of stormwater.”137
Most courts interpret point source in terms of the
general distinctions between point sources and nonpoint
sources found in the legislative history and hinted at by
the statute itself. At a very general level, this is the distinction between stormwater runoff that is not collected
or channeled by human activity, considered to be from
a nonpoint source138; and stormwater runoff that is collected or channeled by human activity, considered to be
from a point source.139 While this is a useful distinction,
it is sometimes not dispositive because courts may believe
that conveyances of stormwater flow created or channeled
by minor human activity or by human activity not aimed
at controlling water is insufficient to constitute a point
source.140 Moreover, many point source decisions do not
involve stormwater flow at all, even decisions holding that
there is no point source.

2.

Getting Beyond Semantics: Dropping the
Point Source/Nonpoint Source Distinction

The problem with interpreting point source by distinguishing between point sources and nonpoint sources is that
Congress did not define nonpoint sources. They could be
indiscernible, unconfined, and indiscrete conveyances or
they might not be conveyances at all. When the legislative history and court decisions speak of nonpoint source
pollution or a nonpoint source pollutant, they are referring to pollution and pollutants, not to conveyances. The
easiest way to resolve this semantic and conceptual problem is simply to eliminate the concept of nonpoint sources
from the interpretation of point source. We can still use
the factors that courts consider to determine whether a
conveyance is a point source. The benefits to nonpoint
sources of evading regulation under §402 will not be lost
to them, because if there is no point source, there is no
regulation under §402. Moreover, Congress has provided
that some discharges from point sources are not regulated
under §402, and EPA has promulgated regulations providing that other discharges from point sources are exempted
from the requirement of securing a §402 permit.141 EPA
137. 40 C.F.R. §122.26(a)(9)(i).
138. Northwest Envtl. Def. Ctr., 640 F.3d at 1070-71; Greater Yellowstone
Coal. v. Lewis, 628 F.3d 1143, 1153, 41 ELR 20059 (9th Cir. 2010) (seep
through cover over mining pit).
139. Northwest Envtl. Def. Ctr., 640 F.3d at 1070-71; Greater Yellowstone, 628
F.3d at 1152 (mine drainage system); Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines,
Inc., 421 F.3d 1133, 1142-44, 35 ELR 20175 (10th Cir. 2005); Sierra Club
v. Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41, 45, 10 ELR 20552 (5th Cir. 1980).
140. Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1372-74, 6 ELR 20732
(4th Cir. 1978).
141. 40 C.F.R. §122.3. Query whether EPA has the authority to do so. See generally Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 8 ELR 20028
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has also extended indefinitely the exemption for discharges
composed entirely of stormwater from the §402 permit
requirement that Congress provided only until October 1,
1994.142 The Article’s analysis will proceed without distinguishing between point sources and nonpoint sources. It
will, however, use many of the reasons courts have used to
make that purported distinction. But it will use them as
factors only to determine whether a particular discharge is
through a point source rather than to determine whether it
is through a point source or nonpoint source.

3.

The Factors Test

To deal with the difficult distinction between discharges
by point and nonpoint sources, courts have developed
an analysis weighing specific factors under the circumstances of the cases.143 They have not labeled their analyses as a factors-weighing test, but the factors they use are
clear, although the weight courts give them is not clear
or well-articulated. Although courts have used these factors to determine whether a flow is discharged by a point
source or a nonpoint source, they can be applied to the
narrower question of whether a flow is discharged through
a point source. As discussed below, the factors are whether:
(1) human activity collects and channels stormwater flow;
(2) a single source discharges pollutants or multiple, dispersed sources discharge pollutants; (3) an artificial system channels water; (4) an industrial or municipal activity
produces the pollutants discharged; and (5) the activity
producing pollutants is more susceptible to end-of-pipe
treatment technology and numerical effluent limitations
or to best management practice. The first factor decides
most cases involving stormwater flow, but is irrelevant in
cases not involving stormwater runoff flow. Courts have
considered the remaining factors regardless of whether
cases involve runoff stormwater flow. By their very nature,
factors tests are not entirely satisfactory because they do
not always conclusively point to one answer and, therefore,
do not produce uniform results. The less than satisfactory
nature of a factors test to interpret “point source,” however,
is mitigated by the list of examples in the definition, which
point to a single answer in most cases. The factors are discussed in more detail below.

a.

The Human Activity Factor

No factor is more important or cited more often in determining whether a discharge is from a point source than
the question of whether or not human activity collects and
(D.C. Cir. 1977).
142. CWA §402(p); 40 C.F.R. §122.26(a)(9)(i). Again, query whether EPA has
the authority to do so. See generally Costle, 568 F.2d 1369.
143. EPA independently developed a more abbreviated factors test at an early
date, but has not elaborated on it since. It wrote that discharges of pollutants are by nonpoint sources when the discharges are (1) “induced by
natural sources”; (2) “not traceable to any discrete or identifiable facility”;
and (3) “better controlled through the utilization of best management practices.” 44 Fed. Reg. 24700 (June 18, 1976), quoted in Northwest Envtl. Def.
Ctr., 640 F.3d at 1075.
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channels the flow of stormwater into navigable waters.144 If
the stormwater is collected and channeled by human activity into navigable waters, it is usually from a point source.
If stormwater reaches navigable water entirely through
natural means, it is usually not from a point source. This
reflects both legislative history and EPA’s regulatory definition of “discharge of a pollutant” to include “surface runoff
which is collected or channeled by man . . . .”145 It should
be remembered, however, that the statutory definition of
point source says nothing about human activity; indeed,
the fifth element of the §301(a) offense, “by any person,”
independently supplies that requirement.
The meaning of the human activity factor is explored in
greatest depth by the Fifth Circuit in Sierra Club v. Abston
Construction Co., Inc.146 In that case, the defendant sprayed
liquid chemicals on a pile of ore to leach gold and collected
the leachate to extract gold from it in a laboratory. It operated a supposedly closed loop system of sumps, ditches,
hoses, pumps, and ponds to contain, collect, and recycle the
leachate, thus preventing it from entering navigable water.
The liquid overflowed its restraints during a storm event,
either because the system was undersized, inadequately
designed, or simply malfunctioned. The operation also had
piles of waste rock from which pollutants flowed into the
stream in stormwater runoff. The court characterized the
ultimate question as “whether pollutants were discharged
from ‘discernible, confined, and discrete conveyance(s)’
either by gravitational or nongravitational means.”147 The
plaintiff argued that because the original source of the pollutants was from a human activity, they were added from
a point source. The defendant argued that because the pollutants were carried by rainfall and natural erosion, they
were not from a point source, even if they were created as a
result of human activity.
The United States, as amicus curiae, argued that because
the “surface runoff [was] collected or channeled by the
operator [it] constitutes a point source discharge.”148 The
Abston court agreed with the United States. It held that:
Gravity flow, resulting in a discharge into a navigable
body of water, may be part of a point source discharge
if the miner at least initially collected or channeled the
water and other materials . . . [or] where miners design
spoil piles from discarded overburden such that, during
periods of precipitation, erosion of spoil pile walls results
in discharges into a navigable body of water by means of
ditches, gullies and similar conveyances . . . Nothing in
the Act relieves miners from liability simply because the
operators did not actually construct those conveyances,
144. Greater Yellowstone, 628 F.3d at 1152; Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, 575
F.3d 199, 221 (2d Cir. 2009); Committee to Save Mokelumne River v. East
Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 13 F.3d 305, 308, 24 ELR 20225 (9th Cir. 1993);
Environmental Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pacific Lumber Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 803,
822, 37 ELR 20012 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
145. 40 C.F.R. §122.2.
146. Sierra Club v. Abston Constr., Inc., 620 F.2d 41, 10 ELR 20552 (5th Cir.
1989).
147. Id. at 45.
148. Id.
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so long as they are reasonably likely to be the means by
which pollutants are ultimately deposited into a navigable
body of water. Conveyances of pollution formed either
as a result of natural erosion or by material means, and
which constitute a component of a mine drainage system,
may fit the statutory definition.149

The court concluded that while “the point source definition ‘excludes unchanneled and uncollected surface waters,’
surface runoff from rainfall, when collected or channeled
. . . in connection with mining activities, constitutes point
source pollution.”150
Overflows of stormwater from pollutant collection
and storage systems are commonly held to be from point
sources, even though the overflows are from storm events
and are from facilities constructed for the purpose of collecting and channeling stormwater.151 EPA regulations,
however, may give some relief from overflows in extraordinary storm events, such as its exemption of the zero
discharge limit from CAFOs in the event of a 25-year
storm event.152
Mining and rock piles are a type of subcategory in the
human activity category. This factor commonly occurs
in cases involving mining waste, especially with regard
to runoff from rock piles of various types. The argument
that the CWA generally exempted mining wastes from the
§402 permit program was decisively rejected at an early
date (1979) by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Earth
Sciences, Inc.153 Whether piles of rock at mining and other
sites are point sources, however, has been a continuing
issue and one that is fact-dependent because runoff from
such piles results both from natural sources, such as precipitation and gravity, and human activity, such as the
placement of the piles discussed in Abston Construction.
The earliest decision on this issue, Appalachian Power Co. v.
Train,154 was a challenge to EPA’s promulgation of effluent
guidelines applicable to steam electric generating facilities.
Industry admitted that runoff from coal piles and chemical
handling facilities was from point sources, but argued that
runoff from construction sites was not. It is not clear from
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s opinion
what the principled difference was, although the court held
(at least) that the application of the guidelines to construction site runoff was sufficiently vague to vacate and remand
that portion of the regulations. In doing so, the court did
not reject EPA’s contention that runoff collected or channeled by man was from point sources.155 Subsequent decisions have found runoff from piles to be from point sources
149. Id.
150. Id. at 47.
151. Reynolds v. Rick’s Mushroom Serv., Inc., 246 F. Supp. 2d 449, 456-58
(E.D. Pa. 2003); Fishel v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 640 F. Supp. 442,
16 ELR 20634 (M.D. Pa. 1986); O’Leary v. Moyer’s Landfill, Inc., 523 F.
Supp. 642, 12 ELR 20239 (E.D. Pa. 1981); United States v. Oxford Royal
Mushroom Prods., Inc., 487 F. Supp. 952, 10 ELR 20549 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
152. 40 C.F.R. §122.23(a).
153. 599 F.2d 368, 371-73, 23 ELR 21526 (10th Cir. 1979); accord Trustees for
Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 557-58, 15 ELR 20146 (9th Cir. 1984).
154. 545 F.2d 1351, 6 ELR 20732 (4th Cir. 1978).
155. Id. at 1373-75.
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because the human placement of the piles dictates where
natural gravity directs the runoff to navigable waters.156

b.

The Number of Sources Factor

This factor is variously described as whether there is one
identifiable, discrete source discharging pollutants or
instead whether there are multiple, dispersed sources discharging pollutants. Sometimes, the factor is described as
whether pollutants are traceable to a single source.157 It is
rooted in the legislative history distinguishing between
point and nonpoint sources. A common comparison is
between a factory with a pipe discharging pollutants and
a road with thousands of vehicles leaving traces of rubber, lead, and other pollutants on its surface to be carried
to navigable water by precipitation flow. The common
assumption courts make when using this factor is that a
single source is susceptible to regulation by a permit, while
multiple or dispersed sources, as a practical matter, are
not.158 This assumption is sometimes true, but not always.
For instance, EPA can issue general permits to multiple
sources in the same area and subject to identical controls,
such as oil drilling platforms in the Gulf of Mexico.159
Congress also authorized EPA to control hundreds or
thousands of municipal storm drains in one permit issued
to the municipality or other jurisdiction owning them.160
Congress gave no such authority to EPA regarding water
pollution from vehicles or roads. In any event, a general
permit would not help to control millions of cars, registered anywhere in the country and beyond, each leaving
small bits of pollutants on a road. Because an automobile
can go anywhere, it would be impossible to know what
water quality standards its discharges must comply with
156. Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1009, 34 ELR 20104
(11th Cir. 2004) (piles of scrap debris); Bravos v. EPA, 324 F.3d 1166,
1169 (10th Cir. 2003) (waste rock piles at mine); Consolidation Coal Co.
v. Costle, 604 F.2d 239, 249, 9 ELR 20511 (4th Cir. 1979) (piles of coal,
chemical, and construction material).
157. Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199, 220 (2d Cir. 2009);
League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v.
Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2002) (“nonpoint source pollution . . . is widely understood to . . . arise[ ] from many dispersed activities
over large areas, and is not traceable to any single discrete source”); United
States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 652, 23 ELR 21526 (2d Cir.
1993) (Oakes, J., dissenting) (nonpoint sources are from “runoff [occurring] in diffuse patterns, over land and into navigable waters”); Trustees, 749
F.2d at 558; Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d at 371 (“oil and gas runoffs caused by
rainfall on the highways, are virtually impossible to isolate to one polluter,
no permit or regulatory system was established as to them”); U.S. EPA ex
rel. McKeown v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 162 F. Supp. 2d 173, 189
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Beartooth Alliance v. Crown Butte Mines, 904 F. Supp.
1168, 1173, 26 ELR 20639 (D. Mont. 1995) (nonpoint source status “is
limited to uncollected runoff water which is difficult to ascribe to a single
polluter”); Washington Wilderness Coal. v. Hecla Mining Co., 870 F. Supp.
983, 988, 25 ELR 20661 (E.D. Wash. 1994) (“the touchstone for finding a
point source is the ability to identify a discrete facility from which pollutants
have escaped . . . non-point source designation is limited to uncollected runoff water from, for example, oil and gasoline on a highway, which is difficult
to ascribe to a single polluter”).
158. “Because [nonpoint source pollution] arises in such a diffuse way, it is very
difficult to regulate through individual permits.” League of Wilderness Defenders, 309 F.3d at 1184. See also Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d at 371.
159. 40 C.F.R. §122.28.
160. CWA §402(p)(3)(B)(i).
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or to know which state must certify that its operation will
meet the state’s standards under CWA §401. By those
standards, the road itself or its drainage system, however,
would be susceptible to control by CWA individual or general permits. Indeed, roads would be in a better position to
capture and control such pollutants than vehicles using the
roads. But, as discussed above, roads are not conveyances
of pollutants to navigable waters in the sense contemplated
for point sources, although their drainage ditches may be.
The Supreme Court skirted the issue in Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center,161 holding, on the basis
of EPA’s interpretation of its industrial stormwater regulation and its silviculture point source regulation, that collected and channeled runoff discharges from logging roads
were not from point sources. The focus of the decision and
the largest point of contention among the Justices was
the appropriateness of the almost complete deference that
courts give to an agency’s interpretations of its own regulations, following Auer v. Robbins.162 Chief Justice John
Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito concurred in Decker,
but suggested that the Court should reconsider Auer. Justice Antonin Scalia dissented on this part of the decision,
asserting that the Court should reconsider and overturn
Auer and that without deference to EPA’s interpretation of
its own regulation, runoff from the logging roads collected
and channeled by pipes, ditches, and channels to navigable waters would be discharged from point sources. Both
the majority opinion163 and Justice Scalia’s dissent164 provide detailed analyses of CWA §402(p) and EPA’s indus161. 133 S. Ct. 1326, 43 ELR 20062 (2013).
162. 519 U.S. 410 (1997).
163. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, begins with
the proposition that §402(p) exempts discharges composed entirely of
stormwater from requiring §402 permits, except for discharges “associated
with an industrial activity,” §402(p)(2)(B). The majority’s analysis failed
to note that the exemption expired in 1994. It stated that the CWA did
not define “industrial activity,” but EPA did so in its industrial stormwater
regulation, 40 C.F.R. §22.26(b)(14), defining “associated with an industrial
activity” to include discharges of stormwater “directly related to manufacturing, processing or raw materials storage areas in an industrial plant . . .
includ[ing] . . . storm water discharges from . . . immediate access roads . . .
used or traveled by carriers of raw materials, manufactured products, waste
materials, or by-products used or created by the facility . . . .” EPA interpreted the phrase to include only traditional industrial operations like sawmills
and other fixed and permanent operations, as opposed to logging operations
that were outdoor and impermanent. The majority noted that under Auer,
courts must defer to an agency’s interpretation of its regulations if the interpretation is reasonable; it need not be the only or the best interpretation in
order to warrant deference. The majority found EPA’s interpretation to be
reasonable and accordingly granted it deference.
164. Justice Scalia starts by casting doubt on whether the discharges are exempted
by §402(p)(a) because stormwater discharges are not “‘natural runoff’ when
they are channeled through manmade pipes and ditches, and carry with
them manmade pollutants, from manmade forest roads.” Decker, 133 S. Ct.
at 1326, 1342 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Even if it were, however, §402(p)’s
recapture provision for stormwater associated with industrial activities, as
interpreted by EPA’s regulation, 40 C.F.R. §122.27(b)(1), covers SIC Code
24, the forest products industry, including Group 2411, “Logging,” for establishments primarily engaged in cutting timber, whose primary product
is logs. “That,” wrote Justice Scalia, “I would think, is that.” Decker, 133 S.
Ct. at 1343 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Cutting timber simply does not involve a
fixed and permanent facility as argued by EPA. That addressed EPA’s industrial stormwater regulation, but not its amended silvicultural point source
definition consisting of four particular operations, which Justice Scalia apparently concluded, without analysis, was within EPA’s authority.
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trial stormwater and silviculture regulations, 40 C.F.R.
§§122.26 and 122.27. The majority’s focus on EPA’s interpretation of regulations applied to particular silvicultural
activities diminishes the force of its decision on the general
issue of whether road ditches are point sources. Justice Scalia’s dissent, however, focuses precisely on that issue, as well
as on an exhaustive analysis of the regulations. His analysis
on the general question is straightforward and persuasive
and very much leaves open the question of whether road
ditches and similar stormwater drainage systems are point
sources, although they may be exempted from regulation
by §402(p). While this factor is not dispositive in all cases,
it is useful.

c.

The Artificial System Factor

The “artificial” part of this factor duplicates and adds nothing to the first human activity factor. The “system” part
of the factor, however, adds a new consideration that has
been useful in some cases. A few courts have used this factor to decide that the addition of pollutants was not from
a point source. None of them involve precipitation runoff, but the factor could be easily used in runoff cases. In
United States v. Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc.,165 the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a person is not a point source, at least not in a criminal case
under the rule of lenity. Although the decision used many
interpretive devices, its primary focus was on the wording of the definition of point source and the examples it
includes, commenting that they “evoke images of physical
structures and instrumentalities that systematically act as
a means of conveying pollutants from an industrial source
to navigable waters”166 as opposed to the “myriad, random
acts of human waste disposal, for example, a passerby who
flings a candy wrapper into the Hudson River, or a urinating swimmer.”167 The decision as a whole is questionable, as
we will examine in detail below. If the Second Circuit had
made the observation that all of the examples given in the
definition of point source are inanimate, while a person is
animate, it would have made a pertinent observation. But
to conclude that the definition suggests that point sources
are only physical structures that systematically convey pollutants from an industrial source is overblown. The first
and most common examples of a point source, pipes,
commonly carry municipal, commercial, and agricultural
waste as well as industrial waste.
In Hudson Riverkeeper Fund, Inc. v. Harbor at Hastings
Associates,168 the plaintiff alleged that trash falling from
an abandoned and dilapidated building into an adjacent
river violated CWA §301(a) because the building was a
point source. The Southern District of New York cited the
above-quoted language from Plaza Health and summarily held that the building was not a point source because
165. 3 F.3d 643, 23 ELR 21526 (2d Cir. 1993).
166. Id. at 646.
167. Id. at 647.
168. 917 F. Supp. 251, 26 ELR 21120 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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“the discharge of material” from it “would not be deliberate or systematic.”169 If the court meant that an addition
must be intentional for it to be from a point source, it is
simply wrong. The Supreme Court has held that passive
owners of point sources are liable for additions of pollutants to navigable waters from their point sources.170
Moreover, civil liability under the CWA is commonly
held to be strict171 and even criminal liability may be
negligent.172 What the court meant by “systematic” is not
clear. Perhaps, it meant the complained-of action must
be continuing rather than a one-time event. That interpretation is wrong as well, for spills are one-time events
and unpermitted spills of pollutants from point sources
violate the statute.173 Indeed, the CWA requires EPA to
develop best management practices to prevent spills, for
inclusion in permits to industrial dischargers.174
Several other decisions used the system approach to
determine that a facility was a point source. In Frobel v.
Meyer, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, citing the Second Circuit’s Plaza Health decision,
commented that point source “connotes the terminal end
of an artificial system for moving water waste, or other
materials.”175 The Tenth Circuit in Earth Sciences answered,
in part, an argument that an overflowing sump was not a
point source by commenting that “[w]e have no problem
finding a point source here. The undisputed facts demonstrate the combination of sumps, ditches, hoses and pumps
is a circulating or drainage system to serve this mining
operation.”176 The Fifth Circuit in Abston Construction later
held that “[c]onveyances of pollution formed either as a
result of natural erosion or by material means, and which
constitute a component of a mine drainage system, may fit
into the statutory definition” of point source.177 In Williams
Pipe Line Co. v. Bayer Corp., an Iowa district court held
that an oil pipeline facility was a point source.178 Another
district court in North Carolina Shellfish Growers Ass’n v.
169. Id. at 257.
170. South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95,
104-05, 34 ELR 20021 (2004).
171. Stoddard v. Western Carolina Regional Sewer Auth., 784 F.2d 1200, 1208,
16 ELR 20503 (4th Cir. 1986); Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., Inc., 620
F.2d 41, 45, 10 ELR 20552 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Earth Sciences,
Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 374, 23 ELR 21526 (10th Cir. 1979); West Virginia
Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. Huffman, 651 F. Supp. 2d 512, 519, 39
ELR 20201 (S.D. W. Va. 2009); Fishel v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 640 F.
Supp. 442, 446, 16 ELR 20634 (M.D. Pa. 1986).
172. CWA §309(c)(1).
173. See, e.g., United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107, 7 ELR 20253 (6th Cir.
1977); Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D.
Iowa 1997).
174. CWA §304(e).
175. 217 F.3d 928, 30 ELR 20746 (7th Cir. 2000). In this case the county incompletely dismantled a deteriorated dam. Predictably, the current in the
stream carried sediment accumulated behind the dam, depositing it on
gravel bars and native aquatic plants downstream, destroying the natural
habitat of the stream. The plaintiff’s theory was that the remains of the dam
and the channel through which the sediment flowed were a point source. At
that point the nonexistent dam was the terminal end of nothing and was
not a conveyance.
176. Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d at 374.
177. Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., Inc., 620 F.2d 41, 45, 10 ELR 20552
(5th Cir. 1980).
178. Williams Pipe Line Co., 964 F. Supp. at 1318-20.
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Holly Ridge Associates found that an entire tract of land was
a point source when it contained an “extensive network of
seventeen ditches specifically designed to concentrate and
accelerate the flow of stormwater from the track.”179 Finally,
in Reynolds v. Rick’s Mushroom Service, Inc., a Pennsylvania
district court found that a mushroom farmer’s point source
included his whole system to prevent the discharge of pollutants, consisting of “land gradations, berms . . . , sedimentation basin, the wasterwater impoundment, and the
sprayer system.”180

d.

The Nature of the Polluting Activity
Factor

In Plaza Health, the Second Circuit concluded from both
the structure of the CWA181 and its legislative history182
that the §402 permitting program was designed to regulate industrial and municipal waste, not agricultural or
random human waste. It used that conclusion to support
its ruling that human beings are not point sources.183 Later,
in another context, the same circuit commented that nonpoint sources came, in part, from agricultural use of land
adjacent to a river.184 These comments are loosely in accord
with the legislative history, which suggests industrial and
municipal waste are regulated by the §402 permit program, but agricultural waste is not because it was nonpoint
source in nature. This interpretation is overly simplified.
The definition of point source includes CAFOs, which are
agricultural in nature. Moreover, the exemptions for agricultural pollution are limited to “agricultural stormwater
discharges” and “return flows from irrigated agriculture.”185
While these are broad-reaching exemptions, they do not
include everything discharged from a farm. Moreover,
there are many categories of activity that generate pollutants, beyond industrial, municipal, and agricultural.
Commercial activities with point source dischargers, such
as developing photographic film and prints, are regulated
by the CWA permit program.186 Plaza Health’s conclusion,
therefore, is erroneous. Indeed, some courts have rejected
it altogether. The Ninth Circuit, in Greater Yellowstone
Coalition v. Lewis, said “point and nonpoint sources are
not distinguished by the kind of pollution they cause or
by the activity causing the pollution, but rather by whether
the pollution reaches the water through a confined, discrete conveyance.”187 The analytical factor that focuses on
the nature of the polluting activity does not appear to be a
useful one.
179. 278 F. Supp. 2d 654, 681 (E.D.N.C. 2003).
180. 246 F. Supp. 2d 449, 457-58 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
181. United States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 646, 23 ELR 21526
(2d Cir. 1993).
182. Id. at 647.
183. The reasoning of this decision is questionable and will be examined in detail below.
184. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2001).
185. CWA §502(14).
186. 40 C.F.R. pt. 459.
187. 638 F.3d 1143, 1152, 41 ELR 20059 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Trustees for
Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 558, 15 ELR 20146 (9th Cir. 1984)).

e.
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The Appropriate Control Factor

This factor also is rooted in the legislative history, which
suggests that the §402 permit program was designed for
point sources, for which uniform national technologybased standards for similar facilities, expressible in numbers, are appropriate. The legislative history also suggests
that the §402 permit program was not designed for nonpoint sources, for which climate and geography vary so
greatly that they are not susceptible to uniform standards
and are more amenable to control by best management
practices than by technology. While this is a useful distinction, it is somewhat vague. Is intercepting sediment
at a construction site by placing bales of hay in the path
of the flow of stormwater a best management practice
or a use of primitive “hay bale” technology? Moreover,
as we have already discussed, it is possible to intercept
most runoff by trenches and ditches leading the runoff to
sedimentation basins or more effective treatment technologies. The issue is largely one of cost, both in dollars
and in land use. Cost is one of the factors that EPA must
use in developing and promulgating effluent guidelines
for industries.188
The Ninth Circuit has commented that the reason for
the CWA’s focus on point sources rather than nonpoint
sources “is simply that ‘[d]ifferences in climate and geography make nationwide uniformity in controlling nonpoint pollution virtually impossible. Also, the control of
non-point source pollution often depends on land use controls, which are traditionally state or local in nature.’”189
The latter point is overstated. Most pollution control does
not restrict the uses of our land, but rather tells us how we
must conduct some of those uses to avoid injuring others
or society as a whole. Land use control is telling a contractor what he can or cannot build on his land, not that he
must place bales of hay to intercept sediment flowing in
rainwater during active construction. Requiring sediment
control at construction sites to prevent pollution discharges
to navigable water is not inherently a state or local interest.
How and where the bales of hay are placed at a construction site to best contain sediment is entirely a local matter,
dictated by the topography of the site.
At issue in League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Forsgren190 was whether spraying pesticides from an aircraft’s spray bar on rivers in a
national forest required a §402 permit. The Ninth Circuit
easily concluded that the spraying apparatus was a discrete conveyance. The U.S. Forest Service, however, noted
that EPA’s regulations defining silvicultural point sources
excluded “non-point source activities such as . . . pest and
fire control . . . from which there is natural runoff”191 and
argued the exclusion included spraying pesticides for pest
188. CWA §304(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B), & (b)(4)(B).
189. Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 550 F.3d 778, 785, 39
ELR 20297 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Marc R. Poirier, Non-Point Source Pollution, in Envt’l. Practice Guide §18.13 (2008)).
190. 309 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2002).
191. 40 C.F.R. §122.27(b)(1).
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control. The court noted that the regulation excluded only
nonpoint sources from which there is natural runoff. Since
there is no natural runoff from aerial application of pesticides directly onto water, the general understanding of
nonpoint sources did not apply and therefore the regulatory exclusion of point source did not apply. The court
also noted that the preamble to EPA’s silvicultural point
source definition identified three characteristics of nonpoint sources: (1) precipitation flow; (2) number of sources;
and (3) “better controlled through . . . best management
practices”192 than by end-of-pipe treatment. The best control of spraying pesticides over water is to “just say no,” an
end-of-pipe control.193 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held in National Cotton Council v. U.S. EPA
that an aerial pesticide spray apparatus was a point source
in part because it was controllable at the source.194 Other
decisions consider the silviculture point source regulations
in different contexts.195

f.

The Curious Tales of Dams and Ditches

Dams and ditches are conveyances of both stormwater
runoff and non-stormwater runoff. Flood control dams
impound stormwater to control flooding, while other
dams have nothing to do with stormwater, such as runof-the-river dams generating electricity. Some ditches
control stormwater, such as the roadside drainage systems
discussed above, while other ditches have nothing to do
with stormwater, such as ditches carrying water destined
for irrigation. Ditches are included in the list of point
source examples; dams are not. There are thousands of
each, enough to present formidable challenges for the limited resources of permit writers. On the other hand, both
can contribute to the degradation of water quality. Each
presents a unique interpretive issue.
Dams carry pollutants from upstream waters to downstream waters and they certainly are discernible, confined,
and discrete. Thus, even run-of-the-river dams seem to be
point sources. Power-generating dams that convey water
through pipes, sluices, and tunnels through turbines and
ultimately to downstream waters, even more clearly are or
include discernible, confined, and discrete conveyances. At
the outset of the §402 permit program, EPA made a decision that dams did not require permits. The Agency did so
for policy reasons. The acknowledged reason was that the
large number of dams would overwhelm permit writers,
although few presented real water quality issues. The unspoken reason may have been that many dams were owned
and operated by the federal government or were already
subject to federal permit programs that involved environ192. Wilderness Defenders, 309 F.3d at 1188.
193. Indeed, EPA is directed to promulgate technology-based effluent guidelines
for many industrial sources requiring elimination of discharges altogether if
“technologically and economically achievable.” §301(b)(2)(B).
194. 553 F.3d 927, 940, 39 ELR 20006 (6th Cir. 2009).
195. See Decker v. Northwest Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 43 ELR 20062
(2013); Environmental Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pacific Lumber Col, 469 F. Supp.
2d 803, 37 ELR 20012 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
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mental review and control.196 The National Wildlife Federation sued EPA challenging its determination that dams
were not covered by the §402 permit program; the plaintiff
alleged that the Agency lacked the authority to declare that
point sources adding pollutants to navigable waters did
not require §402 permits. The D.C. Circuit upheld EPA’s
determination in National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch.197 While it might be assumed that this decision held
that dams are not point sources, it did not so hold. Instead,
EPA conceded that under some circumstances, dams could
be point sources,198 and the court held that dams did not
add pollutants to downstream waters. Courts today largely
discount the decision because it accorded Chevron deference where none was due.199 All other decisions considering
the issue of whether dams are point sources have held that
they are, at least under the facts of the cases.
Ditches present particular interpretive issues because
they are listed as an example of a point source but also hold
bodies of water, including stormwater runoff that could
be waters of the United States, possibly meaning that they
satisfy two elements of the discharge of pollutants offense.
Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality in Rapanos v. United
States, suggested that ditches could not be navigable water,
in part because they were designated as point sources by
the CWA.200 He admitted that the two could overlap on
occasion, but stated that they could not do so generally.201
The problem with this analysis, however, is that ditches are
man-made trenches in the earth, not bodies of water: They
convey water; they are not water. This was a central point
in National Association of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers,202 where the petitioner challenged a nationwide permit because it applied to some ditches; ditches
could not be waters of the United States because they were
point sources; and the two terms are mutually exclusive.
The D.C. Circuit noted that the plurality in Rapanos did
not declare that “a point source, such as a ditch, can never
be a navigable water under the CWA.”203 It also noted that
a number of courts had held that ditches were navigable
waters204 and the courts that held otherwise did so on the
196. Environmental review was required for all major federal actions significantly affecting the environment under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4370f, ELR Stat. NEPA §§2-209.
Section 401 of the CWA also required federal permit-issuing agencies to
secure from the state in which federal projects, or federally licensed projects, were undertaken a certification that the project would meet state
water quality standards. These statutory provisions, however, would not
address water quality problems from existing dams.
197. 693 F.2d 156, 13 ELR 20015 (1982).
198. Id. at 165.
199. See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 14 ELR 20507 (1984).
200. 547 U.S. 715, 735, 36 ELR 20116 (2006).
201. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 735-36 (The statutory definitions of “point source”
and “navigable waters” suggests that they are “separate and distinct categories.” It “would make little sense if the two categories were significantly
overlapping.” Therefore, ditches “by and large” are point sources and not
navigable waters.).
202. 669 F. Supp. 2d 209, 215, 40 ELR 20104 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
203. Id.at 216.
204. Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1009, 34 ELR 20104
(11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003);
Treacy v. Newdunn Assocs., 344 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2003).
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facts rather than as a matter of law.205 Indeed, Justice Scalia
subsequently concluded that ditches could be point sources.206 Despite the controversy, both dams and ditches convey pollutants and are or can be point sources.

4.

Point Source Issues Not Involving
Precipitation Flow

Most of the decisions above concerned discharges of
stormwater flow in which the distinction between point
and nonpoint sources depended on the degree of human
involvement in the discharge. In cases that were not clear,
the courts developed the other factors to make that determination. In most point source decisions, however, stormwater flow is irrelevant. For example, when bulldozers push
fill material into wetlands, the issue of whether bulldozers
operating in that capacity are point sources has nothing to
do with stormwater flow. In these decisions, courts primarily analyze whether the alleged point source is a “discernible, confined, and discrete conveyance” of pollutants and
whether it is one of the examples listed in the definition
or is analogous to them. Courts often use precedent and
the broad interpretation canon of construction. They may
also use one or more of the factors discussed above. This
section discusses the cases that either fall into broad categories, have precedents on both sides of the issue, or raise
particularly interesting issues.

a.

Vehicles on or in Land, Water, and Air

By far, the largest number of non-runoff decisions concern
whether the defendants’ vehicles are point sources. All of
them hold that vehicles are point sources. Typically, courts
do so by reciting that point source is interpreted broadly
and by citing a precedent or two, often Avoyelles Sportsmen’s
League v. Marsh.207 They probably cite Avoyelles because it
is the earliest appellate court decision holding bulldozers
and backhoes to be point sources, not because its analysis
is exhaustive.208 Despite the absence of analytical attention
to the issue, the courts are undoubtedly correct. Vehicles
fit precisely within the definition as “discernible, confined
and discrete conveyance[s].” The very purpose of vehicles is
to convey people and material. The list of examples given in
the definition includes “rolling stock” and “vessel or other
floating craft,” vehicles whose purposes are to convey peo205. F.D. & P. Enters., Inc. v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 239 F. Supp. 2d 509, 514
(D.N.J. 2003); Haniszewski v. Cadby, 2009 WL 316723 (W.D.N.Y. 2009).
206. “The stormwater here was discharged from logging roads through a series
of pipes, ditches, and channels—all items expressly named in the definition
[of ‘point source’].” Decker v. Northwest Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326,
1344, 43 ELR 20062 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
207. 715 F.2d 897, 922, 13 ELR 20942 (5th Cir. 1983).
208. The Fifth Circuit’s analysis was, in fact, cursory. “[B]ulldozers and backhoes
were point sources, since they collected into windrows and piles material
that may ultimately find its way back into the waters.” Avoyelles, 715 F.2d at
922. It cited United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 668, 4 ELR 20710
(M.D. Fla. 1074), in which a Florida district court found that the point
source element of CWA §301(a) was satisfied because defendant admitted
that he had “discharged from point sources, including dump trucks, drag
lines and bulldozers.”
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ple and materials on land and water. Although other types
of terrestrial vehicles and aircraft are not listed, the nonexhaustive list includes the mentioned examples; it does not
exclude others. Unlisted terrestrial vehicles and aircraft are
conveyances and are analogous to rolling stock and vessels.
It was held fairly early in the §402 permit program that
Navy aircraft dropping ordnance into coastal waters during bombing practice were point sources, with no analysis of the definitional issue.209 Subsequent cases under
the CWA in which aircraft (and sometimes trucks) were
alleged to be point sources involve aircraft spraying pesticides into water. It is not always clear whether the aircraft
(or trucks) or the spray bars attached to them were alleged
to be the point sources. In either event, courts held the
vehicles or the spray apparatus to be point sources, with
little analysis.210
The problem with this easy analysis is that passenger vehicles generally, and automobiles in particular, are
conveyances and therefore point sources. If so, why aren’t
the owners of such vehicles liable for their deposits of oil,
grease, and rubber residue on roads that are ultimately discharged into navigable waters by precipitation flow? Here,
a return to the definitions of “discharge of a pollutant” and
“point source” are useful. Reordering the elements in the
statute somewhat, §301(a) regulates the addition by conveyances of pollutants to navigable waters. It focuses on
point sources as conveyances of pollutants rather than as
the origins of pollutants. Most of the examples of point
sources in the definition emphasize this. We think of the
first, “pipe,” as carrying pollutants, not creating them.
CAFOs are the big anomaly in the list, but they are an
anomaly in the definition for several reasons, which we will
discuss below.
Finally, automobile-produced pollutants are not susceptible to regulation by the §402 permit program. They are
classic multiple and dispersed sources, too many in number
209. “It would be a strained construction of unambiguous language for the court
to interpret that the release or firing of ordnance from aircraft into the navigable waters of Viequis [an island off the coast of Puerto Rico] is not ‘any
addition of any pollutant . . . from any point source,’” Barcelo v. Brown, 478
F. Supp. 646, 664 (D.P.R. 1979). The Supreme Court, on appeal from the
First Circuit’s reversal of the district court on other grounds, stated, without
comment, that the district court held “the release of ordnance from aircraft
or from ships into navigable waters is a discharge of pollutants.” Weinberger
v. Romero Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 309, 12 ELR 20538 (1982).
210. Peconic Baykeeper, Inc. v. Suffolk County, 600 F.3d 180, 40 ELR 20098
(2d Cir. 2010). The district court had held that the spray applicators attached to trucks and aircraft were not point sources because they discharged
into air rather than into water. The Second Circuit made use of the broad
interpretation canon of construction and the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in
League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2002), to reverse. “Here, the spray
apparatus was attached to trucks and helicopters, and was the source of
the discharge. The pesticides were discharged ‘from’ the source, and not
from the air . . . . The District Court’s conclusion that the pesticides were
not discharged from a point source was in error.” Peconic Baykeeper, 600
F.3d at 188-89. In National Cotton Council of America v. U.S. EPA, 553
F.3d 927, 940, 39 ELR 20006 (6th Cir. 2009), the parties assumed that
aerial pesticide spraying was from point sources, but EPA contended that
the point sources did not add pollutants because they sprayed pesticides, not
pollutants. The court rejected that argument. See also Forsgren, 309 F.3d at
1185 (“[A]n airplane fitted with tanks and mechanical spraying apparatus is
a ‘discrete conveyance.’”).
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for EPA to control by permits. They do not convey pollutants to water. They are not susceptible to end-of-pipe treatment technology. There’s not much end-of-pipe technology
that an automobile owner or driver can apply to stop leaving bits of her tires on the highway. Although end-of-pipe
technology may treat pollutants coming from the tailpipes
of motor vehicles, those emissions are already comprehensively regulated by the Clean Air Act (CAA), both in terms
of end-of-pipe and internal technology and fuel content.211
If the technology-based standards required to be applied in
permits to point sources under the CWA are not possible or
appropriate, the other source of effluent limitations in the
CWA, water quality standards, are not possible or appropriate either for they are developed on a local basis and we
don’t know what waters any particular motor vehicle’s pollutants will enter. The only decision to consider this issue
did so in a case alleging that tollbooths on a highway were
point sources, U.S. EPA ex rel. McKeown v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey.212 The court held that the
vehicles passing through the tollbooths were “the sources
of the pollutants complained of” and that they were “air
emissions and not water pollutants,” emissions regulated
by the Clean Air Act rather than the CWA.213

b.

People and Other Animals

In United States v. Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc.,214 the
Second Circuit considered the question of “whether a
human being can be a point source”215 and held that the
CWA “was never designed to address the random, individual polluter.”216 The court began its analysis with the
statutory definition of point source, which the court noted
did not include human beings in its list of examples. Moreover, the court found that the examples “evoke images of
physical structures and instrumentalities that systematically act as a means of conveying pollutants from an industrial source to navigable waterways.”217 It also noted that
“by any person” is already an element in a §301(a) violation
and, therefore, reading point source to include a person
would make “point source” and “by any person” duplicative. Such an interpretation would make the violation read,
“the addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any
person by any person shall be unlawful,’ and this simply
makes no sense.”218 If the court had stopped there, its interpretation of point source would have been well-analyzed, if
not unassailable.219
211. 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7671q, ELR Stat. CAA §§101-618; see 42 U.S.C.
§§7521-7589.
212. 162 F. Supp. 2d 173, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
213. Id.
214. 3 F.3d 643, 23 ELR 21526 (2d Cir. 1993).
215. Id. at 645.
216. Id. at 646.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 647.
219. The issues with its interpretation thus far relate to its comments that the
examples of point source in the definition are physical structures and structures that convey pollutants from industrial sources. Many of the examples,
such as “pipe,” do evoke such images. However, others, such as “channel”

12-2015

The court next analyzed the statute and its legislative
history to demonstrate that the CWA was designed to
regulate industrial and municipal waste, not the random
polluting acts of individuals. First, the court listed a number of sections dealing with point sources,220 implying that
those sections deal exclusively with industrial and municipal discharges. They do not. They sometimes distinguish
between municipal and other point sources.221 But for the
most part, they apply to all point sources, without limiting themselves to industrial point sources. The court
proceeded to legislative history, which it also concluded
focuses on industrial polluters.222 For that conclusion, it
cited a Senate report that distinguished between point
and nonpoint sources223 and a floor statement by Senator
Dole suggesting that all agricultural discharges, including
CAFO discharges, are nonpoint source pollution.224 These
authorities do not support the Second Circuit’s conclusion
that Congress did not intend the CWA to include human
beings as point sources. Indeed, the suggestion by Senator
Dole that CAFOs are not point sources is simply wrong,
undercutting whatever credibility his statement has. The
court then noted the absence of case law or EPA regulations suggesting that human beings are point sources. Of
course, there was no case or regulatory law that people are
not point sources.
Finally, the court observed that holding a human being
to be a point source would lead to the absurd result that
“a passerby who flings a candy wrapper into the Hudson
River, or a urinating swimmer” would violate the statute.225 These images are easily distinguished from the facts
in Plaza Health, where the defendant took waste from
the commercial testing of blood at his laboratory in vials,
which he placed below the high-water line in a bulkhead
so that they would be removed by high tide. This was not
a kid throwing a candy wrapper in the water, but instead
the principal of a commercial activity evading the costs of
proper disposal of medical waste by secretly disposing of it
in navigable waters; his very secrecy is persuasive evidence
of his knowing wrongdoing.
In Oregon Natural Desert Association v. Dombeck, the
Ninth Circuit, citing Plaza Health as its only authority, stated that “[i]t would be strange indeed to classify
as a point source something as inherently mobile as a
cow” and held “the term ‘point source’ does not include
and “discrete fissure” do not, particularly if physical structures are equated
with human-made structures, for channels and fissures occur in nature.
220. CWA §§301, 301(e), 301(g)(2), 304(b)(4)(B), 306, 308(a), 308(c), &
402(f ).
221. CWA §301(b), for example, deals specifically with municipal point sources,
see §301(b)(1)(B), (h), (i) & (j), while the remainder deal with point sources
generally, not specifying industrial point sources. Section 306 requires EPA
to promulgate standards for new sources for at least 27 categories of point
sources, many of which are manufacturing facilities. These are industrial
facilities. But the list includes a number of food-processing facilities. Query
whether they are industrial facilities? EPA has promulgated technologybased standards for a number of commercial facilities, such as the development of photographic film and prints in 40 C.F.R. pt. 459.
222. 3 F.3d at 647.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.

Copyright © 2015 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

12-2015

NEWS & ANALYSIS

a human being or any other animal.”226 Ten years later,
the circuit court cited that decision as good authority in
Oregon Natural Desert Association v. U.S. Forest Service.227
Both cases were challenges to grazing licenses on federal
land without CWA §401 certifications on the theory
that cattle were point sources that would pollute streams
and the granting of the licenses were federal actions that
required §401 certification.
Humans can be conveyances. When we take clean
laundry from the dryer and carry it to the bedroom, we
are conveyances of clean clothes. Animals can be conveyances; horses are an obvious example. Both are discernible, confined, and discrete conveyances. As Judge Oakes
pointed out in his strong dissent in Plaza Health, the holding that humans cannot be point sources opens a gaping
door for evasion of the CWA’s prescription simply by having employees form a bucket brigade from a pollutant-producing facility to the river in place of a pipe.228 Stripped of
its erroneous arguments, the court in Plaza Health could
have come plausibly to the opposite conclusion, as the dissent did. Unfortunately, the government poorly argued the
case. If the government had argued that the vials, as containers, were the point sources, then the issue of humans
as point sources would not have arisen. Indeed, the district court noted that there was an alternative to humans
as point sources in the case: The fissures in the bulkhead
into which the defendant inserted vials of blood to be
washed away by the rising tide could be considered as point
sources, thus removing the issue of whether humans could
be point sources.229
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The definition of point source specifically provides that
“agricultural stormwater discharges” and “return flows
from irrigated agriculture” are not point sources and that
a CAFO is a point source. Unless flowing water is a point
source, however, agricultural stormwater discharges and
return flows from irrigated agriculture cannot be point
sources, even in the absence of the statutory exemption,
because flowing water is not a conveyance; flowing water is
carried by a conveyance. To give those exemptions meaning, they must be applied to additions of pollutants from
agricultural stormwater and return flows from irrigation
agriculture by point sources. Stormwater flow and irrigation return flow may include groundwater that originates
in irrigation by flooding.230

Are CAFOs regulated because they are point sources,
or are they exempted if they deposit their waste into navigable waters through stormwater flows or irrigation return
flows? If pollutants from CAFOs enter navigable water by
means other than stormwater flow or irrigation return flow,
for instance in a stream flowing through the CAFO, then
the exemptions do not come into play. But if pollutants
from the CAFO are discharged to navigable water only
by stormwater flow or irrigation return flow, then which
authority governs: the definition of CAFO as a point
source or the exemptions? Under the canon of statutory
interpretation that the specific governs over the general,231
the definition of CAFO as a point source should govern,
because the exemptions of stormwater flow and irrigation
return flow are general types of agricultural flow, while
flow from a CAFO is a specific agricultural flow.232 It also
can be argued that unless flow from CAFOs is covered by
§301(a), the inclusion of CAFOs in the definition of point
source has no meaning. This is a weaker argument, however, because a CAFO would still be a point source if a
stream flowed through it.
EPA has defined CAFOs in great detail in 40 C.F.R.
§122.23 and courts have applied the definition as written.
To be a CAFO, the operation must contain more than the
number of animals specified in the regulation. EPA may
also designate smaller operations as CAFOs if they significantly contribute to violations of water quality standards.
Once it is a CAFO, the point source includes not just the
feeding operation, but ancillary areas for raising or housing
the animals and storing or disposing of manure. Thus, discharges from adjacent fields used to spread or store manure
violate the statute unless performed in compliance with the
regulations.233 We have already seen that the CWA does
not regulate CAFOs because they are point sources; they
must also add pollutants to navigable water in order to be
regulated. The CAFO must be designed not to discharge
except as a result of a 25-year, 24-hour storm event and may
discharge only as a result of such an event. Thus, a properly designed CAFO violates the statute if it discharges as a
result of a lesser storm event.234
Mushroom-growing operations, like CAFOs, often dispose of their wastewater by spraying it on adjacent fields
as fertilizer. When properly designed and applied, it does
not escape into adjacent waterways. If it is overapplied, or
applied using improperly designed or deteriorated retention facilities, it may flow into such waterways. When it
does so without or in violation of a permit, it violates the
statute.235 One court remarked on the similarity of the

226. 172 F.3d 1092, 28 ELR 21471 (9th Cir. 1998).
227. 550 F.3d 778, 782, 39 ELR 20297 (9th Cir. 2008).
228. The district court opinion, United States v. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. 6, 8-11, 22
ELR 21027 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), rev’d sub nom. United States v. Plaza Health
Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 23 ELR 21526 (2d Cir. 1993), is extremely wellanalyzed, using more interpretive devices than any other decision in this
Article. See infra tbl. B.
229. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. at 10.
230. Fishermen Against Destruction of Env’t, Inc. v. Closter Farms, Inc., 300
F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2002).

231. William N. Eskridge Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 324
(1994); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law 183-89
(2012).
232. Community Ass’n for Restoration of Env’t v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d
943, 955 (9th Cir. 2002) (“because the farm itself falls within the definition
of CAFO and is not subject to the agricultural exemption”).
233. Id.
234. Carr v. Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 931 F.2d 1055, 1059-60, 21 ELR 21005
(5th Cir. 1991).
235. Reynolds v. Rick’s Mushroom Serv., Inc., 246 F. Supp. 2d 449, 457 (E.D.
Pa. 2003) (“point source” was the entire control system consisting of “land

c.

CAFOs, Fish-Raising Facilities, and Other
Agricultural Discharges
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mushroom-growing control system to CAFO control systems and that used to collect and contain mining waste in
Earth Sciences.236
Fish-raising facilities are analogous to CAFOs and are
regulated similarly. EPA defines point source to include
a “concentrated aquatic animal production facility” by
producing designated numbers and weights of fish raised,
and provides that the Agency may designate a smaller
operation as a point source if it contributes significantly
to a violation of water quality standards.237 Where a fish
hatchery is below the size designated as a point source
in the regulation, it is not a point source unless so designated by EPA because the operation significantly contributes to violations of water quality standards.238 The
definition includes operations raising cold water fish
in “ponds, raceways, or other similar structures which
discharge at least 30 days a year.”239 The Agency interprets that to include offshore net pen operations raising
salmon, and its interpretation has been upheld by at least
one court.240 While CAFO discharges are usually of polluted stormwater and mushroom-growing discharges
may be of polluted stormwater, fish-raising operation discharges are not of polluted stormwater.

V.

Conclusion

The statutory definition of point source is the most detailed
and complex of the definitions of the elements of the water
pollution offense. But the interpretation of point source
is complicated by the statutory juxtaposition of the term
with nonpoint source and the statutory failure to define
nonpoint source or to draw a bright line between the two
terms. The statutory history adds to the complication by
suggesting that the presence of precipitation runoff is the
signature of nonpoint sources, a false suggestion if the runoff is collected and channeled by human activity. Adding
to the confusion is the tendency of courts and EPA to conflate point source and nonpoint source with other elements
of the offense, such as by referring to a “point source pollutant.” (As mentioned at the beginning of this Article, “pollutant” is a separate element of the §301(a) offense.) Despite
these complications, in most cases, the determination of
whether there is a point source is easy because there is an
obvious “discernible, confined and discrete conveyance”
and it is often one of the examples listed in the statutory
definition, such as a pipe.
At this point, the CWA robustly regulates most discharges of pollutants by point sources, but depends on state
gradations, berms . . . , sedimentation basin, the wastewater impoundment,
and the sprayer system”); United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Prods.,
Inc., 487 F. Supp. 852, 854, 10 ELR 20549 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (overapplication and escape through a break in a berm).
236. Rick’s Mushroom Serv., 246 F. Supp. 2d at 456-577.
237. 40 C.F.R. §122.24 & app. C.
238. Wild Fish Conservancy v. Quilcene Nat’l Fish Hatchery, 2009 WL 3380655
(W.D. Wash. 2009).
239. 40 C.F.R. §122.24(a).
240. U.S. Public Interest Research Grp. v. Atlantic Salmon of Maine, LLC, 215
F.2d 239, 32 ELR 20535 (D. Me. 2002).
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regulation of discharges of pollutants by nonpoint sources.
For the most part, however, such state regulation is neither
pervasive nor robust and most continuing water pollution
problems can be traced primarily to nonpoint sources. The
legislative history of the CWA suggested that relatively
unregulated nonpoint sources should become robustly
regulated point sources over time as national uniform
standards became available to control water pollution from
them. EPA has not expanded the definition of point source
to accomplish this objective. The Agency should begin to
do so. Interpreting and applying the term would be easier
if EPA amended its regulatory definition of point source
to incorporate what case law and the Agency’s own practice have established. Distinguishing point from nonpoint
sources would also be easier if EPA promulgated a regulatory definition of nonpoint source.
The following suggested definitions summarize the
results of this Article’s analysis:
Nonpoint source means conveyances adding pollutants to the waters of the United States for which conveyances are either: (1) indiscernible, unconfined, and
indiscrete; or (2) not the result of human activity, in whole
or in part. Note: Every five years, EPA will review categories of nonpoint sources to determine if cost-effective
technology has become available to treat pollutants discharged by any such category and to add to the list of
point sources in the definition of point source in this section any category of nonpoint source for which such technology has become available.
Point source means any discernible, confined, discrete
conveyance, resulting in whole or in part from human
activity, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, CAFO, landfill leachate collection system, or
vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are
or may be discharged. The term includes human beings
deliberately discharging pollutants produced in the course
of a waste-generating activity and devices collecting and
channeling stormwater, but does not include devices channeling agricultural stormwater, return flow from irrigated
agriculture, or runoff from roads, except as regulated under
CWA §402(p). In determining whether a conveyance is a
point source, the following factors should be taken into
account: (1) human activity collects and channels flow to
navigable waters; (2) there is a single source of pollutants,
rather than multiple or dispersed sources; (3) the conveyance is systematic; and (4) the activity producing the pollutants is susceptible to end-of-pipe treatment technology
with numerical effluent limitations rather than by best
management practices.
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Table A
Decisions Interpreting “Point Source”
U.S. Supreme Court Decisions
1.

Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, 133 S. Ct. 1326, 43 ELR 20062 (2013)

2.

South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, 541 U.S. 95, 34 ELR 20021 (2004)

U.S. Court of Appeals Decisions
3.

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 673 F.3d 880, 41 ELR 20109 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d on other
grounds, 133 S. Ct. 710 (2013)

4.

Northwest Environmental Defense Center v. Brown, 640 F.3d 1063, 41 ELR 20178 (9th Cir. 2011)

5.

National Pork Producers’ Council v. U.S. EPA, 635 F.3d 738, 41 ELR 20115 (5th Cir. 2011)

6.

Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Lewis, 628 F.3d 1143, 41 ELR 20059 (9th Cir. 2010)

7.
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Table B
Analysis of Decisions Interpreting Point Source
Decision
Number

Year

+/-a

Type of Caseb

Canons Used

Number of
Canons Usedc

Number of
Decisions Citedd

CWA §

U.S. Supreme Court Decisions
1.

2013

-

Cit. S.

4, 5, 6, 22

4

--

402

2.

2004

+

Cit. S.

2, 5, 21

3

--

402

1, 5, 6

3

4

402

U.S. Court of Appeals Decisions
3.

a.
b.

c.
d.

2011

+

Cit. S.

4.

2011

-

Cit. S.

1, 3, 5, 6

4

4

402

5.

2011

-

Jud. Rev.

1, 5

2

4

402

6.

2010

+

Cit. S.

1, 5

2

3

402

7.

2010

+

Crim.

5

1

--

402

8.

2010

+

Cit. S.

1, 2, 5

3

3

402

9.

2009

-

Cit. S.

1, 2, 4, 5, 6

5

7

402

10.

2009

+

Jud. Rev.

1, 2, 5, 6

4

4

402

11.

2008

-

Cit. S.

1, 6

2

3

402

12.

2008

+

Crim.

1, 3, 5

3

6

402

13.

2005

+

Crim.

1

1

4

404

14.

2005

+

Cit. S.

1, 4, 5, 6

4

5

402

15.

2005

+

Enf.

1

1

4

404

16.

2004

+

Cit. S.

1, 2

2

2

402

17.

2002

-

Cit. S.

1, 4, 5, 13, 22

5

2

402

18.

2002

+

Cit. S.

1, 2

2

2

402

19.

2002

+

Cit. S.

1, 5

3

2

402

20.

2002

-

Cit. S.

1

1

1

402

21.

2001

+

Jud. Rev./Enf.

1, 2

2

1

404

22.

2000

-

Cit. S.

1, 5

2

5

402/404

23.

1997

+

Crim.

1, 2, 5

3

5

402

24.

1994

+

Cit. S.

1, 2, 4, 5

4

7

402

25.

1993

+

Cit. S.

1, 5

2

2

402

26.

1993

-

Crim.

1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 13, 20, 21

8

7

402

27.

1991

+

Cit. S.

1, 2, 14

3

3

402

28.

1991

+

Cit. S.

5

1

--

402

29.

1984

+

Jud. Rev.

1, 3, 6

3

2

402

30.

1983

+

Cit. S.

1, 5

2

2

402

31.

1982

-

Cit. S.

1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 18

6

1

402

32.

1982

-

Cit. S.

5

1

--

402

33.

1980

+

Cit. S.

1, 5

2

2

402

34.

1979

+

Enf.

1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 10

6

2

402

Plus (+) denotes an expansive interpretation of point source; minus (-) denotes a restrictive interpretation. Note that even though the interpretation of
point source may be expansive, the environmental party may have lost the case for other reasons.
Canons used to interpret point source: (1) precedent; (2) broad interpretation to achieve statutory purpose; (3) legislative history; (4) deference; (5) plain
meaning; (6) structure of statute; (7) harmonize with other statutes; (8) avoid absurd results; (9) avoid constitutional issues; (10) interpret exceptions narrowly; (11) honor federalism; (12) exception proves the rule; (13) give every word meaning; (14) interpret waivers narrowly (finality); (15) inclusiveness of
definition; (16) exclusiveness of definition; (17) equity; (18) avoid administrative difficulties; (19) inclusion of one implies exclusion of another; (20) rule of
lenity; (21) ejusdem generis; and (22) rule of the last antecedent.
Cit. S. means citizen suit; Crim. means criminal prosecution; Enf. means civil enforcement; Jud. Rev. means judicial review.
Decisions Cited refers only to Supreme Court or lower federal court precedent interpreting point source.

Copyright © 2015 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

Decision
Number

Year

+/-a

Type of Caseb

35.

1977

+

Jud. Rev.

36.

1976

-

Jud. Rev.

Canons Used

Number of
Canons Usedc

Number of
Decisions Citedd

CWA §

1, 3, 5, 6, 18

5

1

402

5, 6

2

--

402

U.S. District Court Decisions
37.

2010

+

Cit. S.

5

1

38.

2010

+

Jud. Rev.

1, 6, 8

3

402
8

404

39.

2010

+

Enf.

1, 5

2

1

404

40.

2009

-

Cit. S.

1, 4

2

1

402

41.

2009

+

Cit. S.

1, 5

2

2

404

42.

2009

+

Cit. S.

1, 4, 5, 8, 13

5

2

402

43.

2009

+

Enf.

15

1

5

404

44.

2008

--

Cit. S.

1

1

9

402

45.

2007

+

Cit. S.

1, 2, 5

3

7

402

46.

2003

+

Cit. S.

1, 5

2

5

402/404

47.

2003

+

Cit. S.

1, 2, 4

3

3

402

48.

2002

+

Cit. S.

1, 2, 4, 5

4

8

402

49.

2001

-

Cit. S.

1, 7, 16, 21

4

5

402

50.

1999

+

Cit. S.

1, 5

2

1

402

51.

1998

--

Cit. S.

1, 6

2

2

402/404

52.

1997

+

Cit. S.

1, 8

2

3

402

53.

1996

+

Jud. Rev.

1, 2, 6

3

4

402

54.

1996

+

Crim.

1

1

1

404

55.

1996

-

Cit. S.

1, 16

2

2

402

56.

1996

+

Cit. S.

1, 2

2

8

402

57.

1995

+

Cit. S.

1, 2, 4

3

2

402

58.

1995

+

Cit. S.

1, 5

2

1

402

59.

1994

+

Cit. S.

1, 2, 4

3

8

402

60.

1991

+

Crim.

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 15, 21

9

5

402

61.

1990

+

Enf.

1

1

3

404

62.

1990

-

Cit. S.

1, 2, 4, 8

4

3

402

63.

1987

+

Cit. S.

1,5

2

2

402

64.

1986

+

Cit. S.

1, 2

2

4

402

65.

1981

+

Cit. S.

1, 5

2

3

402

66.

1980

+

Enf.

1, 5

2

1

404

67.

1980

+

Crim.

1, 5, 6

3

1

402

68.

1979

+

Cit. S.

1, 5

2

2

402

69.

1978

+

Cit. S.

1, 5

2

1

402

70.

1976

+

Cit. S.

4, 6

2

--

NEPA

71.

1974

+

Enf.

5

1

--

402
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